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1988 Cabinet Documents Project

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Beyond Expo

An overview of the 1988 Cabinet Documents

Anthony Marinac¹

Throughout the rest of Australia, 1988 will primarily be remembered as the year of the Bicentenary – a national party, and for Indigenous Australians, a year of concerted protest. In Queensland, though, 1988 was unquestionably the year of Expo.

1988-89 also represented the short interregnum between the end of the Bjelke-Petersen Premiership (in December 1987) and the commencement of the Goss Premiership (in December 1989). Mike Ahern, who deposed Bjelke-Petersen, was Premier for all of 1988, and while Expo took centre stage, there were dozens of other significant events dealt with by his Cabinet.

During the year, Cabinet made 2524 decisions. Many of them were administrative or routine, such as the endorsement of the Parole Board's decision to release life sentence prisoners on parole, or approval for overseas travel by public servants. One hundred or so significant decisions have been drawn from the Cabinet decisions. This document provides an overview of those. The numbers in the endnotes refer to the relevant cabinet decisions.

Fitzgerald

Tony Fitzgerald QC continued his Commission of Inquiry into corruption in Queensland throughout 1988. Many of the key events of the Inquiry, such as the capture of bagman Jack Herbert, or the appearances of Joh Bjelke-Petersen and Russ Hinze before the inquiry, were historically significant, but did not require attention from Cabinet itself.

Cabinet did, however, have to consider whether the state government would continue to pay the legal costs of senior police such as assistant commissioner Tony Murphy. Cabinet decided to cease this support.¹ Suspended commissioner Sir Terrence Lewis reached retirement age in 1988 and sought to retire, with his full superannuation benefits intact, before Fitzgerald could make findings against him. Cabinet refused to allow this, passing legislation to ensure he could not retire. Cabinet then prevented him from finding other employment.²

During the year, Commissioner Fitzgerald sought an extension of his terms of reference, which was granted,³ and the power to point assistant commissioners, which was also granted.⁴ Later in the year, as it became clear that the inquiry would produce a slew of criminal charge, Cabinet approved legislation to appoint a special prosecutor.⁵

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Curiously, during a difficult period for police, Cabinet was asked to approve funding for a book on the history of the Police Force⁶ (no decision was made). The Police Force had a difficult relationship with its Minister, Bill Gunn, who during 1988 publicly described police as “fat and lazy”. More positively for police, 1988 saw the commencement of the successful Neighbourhood Watch program.⁷

Reforms arising from Fitzgerald

Premier Ahern was between a rock and a hard place with regard to Fitzgerald reforms. He publicly committed his government to implementing the reforms “lock stock and barrel” and while he appears to have been genuinely personally committed to implementing those reforms, there was also a clear political need to distance his government from the corrupt Bjelke-Petersen regime. At the same time, however, Fitzgerald was still some time away from releasing his report. New opposition leader Wayne Goss was publicly calling on Ahern to wait rather than pre-empting Fitzgerald, but Goss naturally also had political objectives, not wishing to see the new National Party government distance itself from Bjelke-Petersen before the 1989 election.

The Ahern Cabinet's reform activities were, in fact, considerable. In addition to prison reform (discussed below), a Public Accounts Committee,⁸ Public Works Committee,⁹ and Foreign Land Interests Register¹⁰ were established; the Police Complaints Tribunal was removed from the Police portfolio and placed within the Department of Justice to enhance its independence,¹¹ reforms were attempted to rationalise public service pay structures,¹² and Ahern introduced a requirement for Ministers to table their expenditures publicly¹³ – a reform which later led to a number of his Ministers being jailed for misappropriation.

History, of course, demonstrates that Ahern ended up pleasing nobody – he was overthrown by his own party just two months before the 1989 election, and then the Nationals were trounced in that election despite having the gerrymander on their side. However some of Ahern's reforms – most notably the Public Accounts and Public Works Committees – remain in place to this day.

Prisons

Prisons are seldom a keynote area of policy – there is an old political saw that “there are no votes in prisons” – but 1988 was an exception. *Whisky au Go Go* bomber James Finch, who was released on parole in early 1988,¹⁴ indicated publicly that the Boggo Road jail in Brisbane was a powderkeg. During the early part of the year, new minister Russell Cooper closed down the notorious “Black Hole” isolation cell under the oval at Boggo Road. There was discontent and threats of strike action among prison guards, and then, after guards shot a prisoner during a riot, a high profile hunger strike undertaken by prisoners, five of whom took the to roof of the prison with protest signs made from bedsheets.

Cooper walked a careful line on these issues. While publicly maintaining a tough stance against the prisoners, he commenced a far-reaching review – the Kennedy review – into the operation of Queensland prisons.¹⁵ The report was utterly scathing

of the department and the prisons service, and Cabinet approved legislation during 1988 taking initial steps to redress some of the issues.¹⁶ Late in the year, five prisoners escaped from Boggo Road, in circumstances which made it clear they must have had assistance from prison staff – they managed to amass 70 bedsheets to create a very sophisticated rope, and then abseil down the side of the jail from the prison guards' catwalk. Cabinet approved large rewards for information leading to their recapture.¹⁷

Prisoners were, one suspects, less happy with Cabinet's decision not to recommend that Her Majesty the Queen grant clemency to prisoners during her visit to Queensland in 1988.¹⁸

Finally, during 1988, the Commonwealth's Royal Commission into Aboriginal Deaths in Custody continued. Queensland continued to fund the Commission, but the cabinet decisions demonstrate an attitude varying from reluctance to outright hostility towards the Royal Commission.¹⁹

Expo and redevelopment

While 1988 was, of course, the year of Expo, by 1988 Cabinet's work had generally been done. The key Expo-related issue for Cabinet in 1988 was the decision to extend liquor licensing hours.²⁰ Cabinet also approved funding for three gala concerts to celebrate Queensland Day at Expo²¹ including a specific (but unsuccessful) decision to request iconic singer Kamahl to perform.²² After Expo was completed, Cabinet noted the great success of the Queensland Pavilion.²³ The real work of 1988 extended beyond Expo, and to consideration of what should happen with the Expo site after the conclusion of Expo. Clearly, it was almost certain that Brisbane would never again have the opportunity to redevelop such a large portion of land, so close to the city.

Initially, tenders were called for and the tender was awarded to the River City consortium,²⁴ who proposed to excise a large portion of South Bank to create an artificial island in the river, with a skyscraper office block on the island – potentially a World Trade Centre.²⁵ There was public outcry against the River City proposal, largely because the public – who had by now fallen in love with Expo – had not been consulted in relation to the proposals. More problematically, it became clear that the River City proposal would only be effective if a casino licence was granted. Cabinet backed away from the River City proposal,²⁶ and instead created the South Bank Development Corporation,²⁷ which went on to manage the South Bank Master Plans of 1992 and 1997.

One key feature of Expo was the monorail, but a proposal to link the new South Bank with the CBD by monorail was not supported.²⁸

Environment

It must be said that 1988 was not a good year for Environment Policy in Queensland. Health Minister Leisha Harvey, the only female member of Ahern's Cabinet, took the leading in eliminating the use of chloroflourocarbons once their harmful effect on the ozone layer was understood.²⁹ Environment Minister Geoff Muntz had the Premier's

support in developing a (perhaps) surprisingly forward-thinking greenhouse gas policy, recognising the potentially devastating effects which climate change might have on Queensland.³⁰

However the key environmental issue for 1988, as for 1987, was the Commonwealth government's proposal to list the tropical rainforests in the north of Queensland as a World Heritage area. A great deal of Cabinet time and attention went into opposing the proposal, and the government funded a Queensland delegation to attend the meeting in Brasilia, Brazil, where the nomination was to be decided. They were unsuccessful and the Wet Tropics World Heritage Area was formed.³¹

The environment gave Queenslanders a reminder of its overwhelming strength in 1988, when Cyclone Charlie wreaked havoc on the Burdekin area in North Queensland; at the same time, much of the state was in drought. Premier Ahern made an initial tour of the area and report to Cabinet, after which combined cyclone/drought reports were made by primary industries minister Neville Harper.³² Perhaps more positively, Cabinet agreed to a moratorium on the opening of new crocodile farms (which rely on wild-caught breeding stock) due to concerns about the numbers remaining in the wild.³³ Cabinet did not, however, agree to a proposal to allow the sale of crocodile and kangaroo meat.³⁴

Finally, and on a much smaller scale, a residential suburb built on a former mine site in Kingston, to the south of Brisbane, had begun around 1986 to leak toxic sludge, from the use of the mine site as a dumping point for oil waste. A number of homes had been repurchased by the Logan City Council, and Cabinet approved funding for demolition and further home purchases. This matter was not finalised until well into the Goss government's tenure.

Health

The key health issue for the year remained HIV/AIDS. The cabinet papers suggest that Minister Harvey was making a genuine attempt to respond to the threat of HIV prior to its spread, but the whole approach to the issue was hamstrung by the conservative government's continuing difficulty dealing with homosexuality. Sodomy remained unlawful in Queensland at this time, and so gay communities remained in hiding. Further, many gay or bisexual men were living outwardly straight, married lives, while secretly participating in sex with other men. All of this meant that the government could not even have a conversation with the most at-risk communities. An underlying tone of the documents was that HIV primarily affected drug users, prostitutes and gay men; and so if people refrained from sex work, drug use and gay sex, HIV would be no problem.³⁵

On HIV, however, Cabinet did take its first faltering steps towards a useful exchange program,³⁶ and the implementation of Human Relationships Education classes in state schools provided an opportunity to educate younger people about safe sex.³⁷

Development

Development at almost any cost had been a hallmark of the Bjelke-Petersen era, and this philosophy continued to some extent during 1988. In addition to the Expo

site redevelopment and potential World Trade Centre, the saga of the World's Tallest Building rolled on, until the proposal was finally defeated, resulting in a Supreme Court challenge to the Brisbane Town Plan.³⁸

A proposal emerged for a Spaceport on Cape York,³⁹ there was a proposal for a joint Japanese-Australian technology mini-city called a "Multi-Function Polis",⁴⁰ Queensland scoped out a bid to be Australia's nominee for the host city of the 1996 Olympics,⁴¹ and both the state and Commonwealth governments had to come to the rescue of the Stockman's Hall of Fame at Longreach, which failed to attract sufficient private funding but which had to be completed in time for its opening by the Queen.⁴²

The Queensland mania for construction took a tragic turn during 1988, when concrete slabs being lifted onto a construction site in the CBD broke through their slings and fell to the footpath, killing three people including a young child. Cabinet almost immediately moved to legislate against the use of such slings.⁴³

Social issues

Setting aside the government's reluctant participation in the Royal Commission into Aboriginal Deaths in Custody, indigenous issues barely received any consideration by Cabinet in 1988. The only key decision was the state's opposition to the formation of the Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islanders' Commission (ATSIC).⁴⁴

Disability issues fared little better: Cabinet continued a scheme to subsidise the use of taxis by people with disabilities,⁴⁵ and amendments were made to the *Intellectually Handicapped Citizens Act 1985-88*.⁴⁶

Women's issues did receive somewhat more attention from Cabinet, despite there being only one female Minister. A Task Force on Domestic Violence was established, and most of its recommendations supported.⁴⁷

The law was changed to recognise the fathers of IVF children (until this change in the law, the sperm donor was, at law, the father).⁴⁸ Queensland agreed to participate in the national Child Support scheme.⁴⁹ And finally, in what seems like a footnote from the middle ages, Cabinet agreed to legislate so that a wife could sue for loss of consortium (that is, the loss of her relationship when her partner dies). Astoundingly, loss of consortium had only been available to husbands in respect of wives, and not vice versa, until this time.⁵⁰

On education policy, the perennial issue of class sizes was discussed,⁵¹ and as noted above, Human Relationships Education was introduced into schools, along with drug education.⁵² Cabinet also, curiously, took the time to instruct the schools that the playing of the National Anthem at school assemblies should also include the playing of the first few bars of God Save the Queen.⁵³

Summary

There is, perhaps, a tendency to see the Ahern premiership as something akin to a placeholder, and Ahern himself as a seat-warmer between Bjelke-Petersen and Goss. A review of the 1988 Cabinet decisions does not support this view. The key personalities in Cabinet, Mike Ahern and Bill Gunn, were moving forward on a range of institutional reforms, while also continuing the Queensland government philosophy of development at (virtually) all costs. Queensland prisons began their journey from the 19th century to the modern era, and Cabinet was careful to look well beyond the triumph of Expo, to lay down the foundations for Brisbane's beloved South Bank precinct.

If 1987 was the end of the Joh era, and 1989 the start of the Goss era, 1988 was the year when Mike Ahern, a frustrated reformer, made a diligent and game attempt under difficult circumstances, to be an effective and forward-looking Premier.

¹ 53791 (Murphy)

² 54355, 55113, 55206

³ 54969

⁴ 54046

⁵ 55296, 55354

⁶ 55777

⁷ 54425

⁸ 54321

⁹ 55595

¹⁰ 54428

¹¹ 53606

¹² 55294

¹³ 55594

¹⁴ 53792

¹⁵ 53652, 55216, 54420

¹⁶ 54420

¹⁷ 55254

¹⁸ 53832

¹⁹ 53392, 53434, 53439, 53499, 53574, 54171, 54172, 54620, 54654, 54733, 54863.

²⁰ 53641, 53847

²¹ 53565

²² 54135

²³ 55562

²⁴ 53444

²⁵ 53399, 53815

²⁶ 54470

²⁷ 55547

²⁸ 54603

²⁹ 54950, 55049, 55348.

³⁰ 53348, 53520.

³¹ 53335, 53428, 53689, 54136, 54276, 54343, 54335, 54639, 54860, 55070, 55249, 55260, 55757.


³² 53714, 53715, 53787, 53819, 53891, 53958.

³³ 53560

³⁴ 53788

³⁵ 53319, 53885, 53920, 54913, 55026.

³⁶ 54693
³⁷ 55450
³⁸ 55016
³⁹ 53403, 55599
⁴⁰ 53505, 54460, 54898
⁴¹ 54515, 54871, 54917
⁴² 53497, 53712, 54015
⁴³ 55156
⁴⁴ 55247, 55351
⁴⁵ 54367
⁴⁶ 55393, 55461
⁴⁷ 55392, 55462, 55564, 55759
⁴⁸ 53835
⁴⁹ 54319, 54362
⁵⁰ 55261
⁵¹ 54199
⁵² 53532
⁵³ 53838



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Legal Aid for Tony Murphy

TITLE: *Legal Costs – Former Assistant Commissioner Murphy – Commission of Inquiry*

Date	14/5/1988	Decision #	53791	Minister	Mike Ahern
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Initially, the legal costs of public service figures requiring representation before the Fitzgerald Inquiry were met from the public purse. Ministers Don Lane and Russell Hinze were the first to be denied public funding when they were stood down by Ahern in 1987. In early 1988, however, senior police figures were still having legal costs paid by the Crown.

Legal funding to disgraced commissioner Terry Lewis was withdrawn in February 1988 (no Cabinet Decision applies), and in March 1988 legal funding was withdrawn for Assistant Commissioner Tony Murphy. It is possible that Murphy may have been even more significant in the “Rat Pack” network of corruption than was Terry Lewis: “bagman” Jack Herbert gave evidence that Murphy had been the one to propose Lewis’ inclusion in “The Joke”, an in-code for the police corruption operation.

Murphy was never charged with any offences arising from the Fitzgerald Inquiry. He died in 2010.

Sir Terence Lewis

Date	23/5/1988	Decision #	54355	Minister	Mike Ahern
Title	<i>Proposed Retirement of Commissioner of Police</i>				
Date	12/9/1988	Decision #	55113	Minister	Mike Ahern
Title	<i>Suspension of Sir Terence Lewis</i>				
Date	26/9/1988	Decision #	55206	Minister	Mike Ahern
Title	<i>Request from Sir Terence Lewis to Seek Employment</i>				

In Cabinet Decision 53708, suspended (and corrupt) police commissioner Sir Terence Lewis sought to retire and obtain his superannuation benefits. Cabinet, while noting that he was entitled to do so, was well aware of the public outcry which would result.

Lewis withdrew his application and his lawyers entered into negotiations with the government, however in April 1988 the Queensland Parliament passed a truly remarkable piece of legislation, the *Public Officers Retirement Act 1988*. This Act prevented any member of the Queensland Police Force from retiring if they were suspended, and prevented any retirement from becoming effective until the Governor in Council accepted the resignation.

The Act was backdated to 1 March 1988, and had a sunset clause of 31 December 1988. In effect, the Queensland Parliament legislated specifically to deprive Lewis of his superannuation.

While it is difficult to feel sympathetic towards Lewis, who was later convicted and spent years in prison, it remains open to consider whether the *Public Officers Retirement Act 1988* was in fact a Bill of Pains and Penalties, and therefore a parliamentary injustice (albeit perpetrated in a sound cause).

In Cabinet Decision 54355, Cabinet formally resolves not to recommend Lewis' retirement to the Governor, with the result that the previous negotiations with Lewis were now null and void. In Cabinet Decision 55113 this decision was confirmed after a further request by Lewis. Finally, in Cabinet Decision 55206 Lewis, who had been suspended for a year and was without an income, sought permission to engage in outside employment (this was necessary as he was still formally a police officer). Permission was denied.

Lewis was ultimately convicted of corruption and forgery, stripped of his Knighthood, and sentenced to more than a decade in prison. He maintains his innocence.

Fitzgerald Inquiry

Date	18/4/1988	Decision #	54046	Minister	Paul Clauson
Title	<i>Deputy to a Commission - Fitzgerald Commission of Inquiry</i>				
Date	25/8/1988	Decision #	54969	Minister	Bill Gunn
Title	<i>Fitzgerald Commission of Inquiry</i>				

During 1988, the Fitzgerald Inquiry was in full swing. The Inquiry Process had developed its own momentum, and as the networks of corruption within Queensland began to be revealed, it was necessary to provide additional support to Mr Fitzgerald, both in terms of resources and authority.

Having already passed legislation to allow the appointment of Deputy Commissioners, in Cabinet Decision 54046 Cabinet agreed to request that the Governor announce that a Deputy Commissioner be appointed. Ultimately, two deputy commissioners: Patsy Wolfe AO (later Chief Judge of the District Court of Queensland) and Gary Crooke QC (later Queensland Integrity Commissioner).

Finally, in August 1988 Cabinet in Cabinet Decision 54969 agreed to Mr Fitzgerald's request that his powers be broadened to give him authority to examine *anything* touching on official misconduct or impropriety provided he considered it was in the public interest to do so. It is clear from the cabinet decision, however, that the purpose of the decision was not to expand the remit of the Inquiry, but rather to ensure that matters which Mr Fitzgerald wished to pursue in relation to his earlier scope could not be objected to on the basis of technical objections regarding the limits of his jurisdiction.

Special Prosecutor – Fitzgerald Inquiry

Date	10/10/1988	Decision #	55296	Minister	Paul Clauson
Title	<i>Fitzgerald Inquiry – Proposed Special Prosecutors Bill</i>				
Date	17/10/1988	Decision #	55307	Minister	Paul Clauson
Title	<i>Fitzgerald Inquiry – Proposed Special Prosecutors Bill</i>				
Date	24/10/1988	Decision #	55354	Minister	Paul Clauson
Title	<i>Fitzgerald Inquiry – Proposed Special Prosecutors Bill</i>				

By late 1988, and following the revelations made by witness Jack Herbert before Fitzgerald, it was clear that criminal prosecutions would be required to be undertaken. While these prosecutions could have been undertaken by the Director of Public Prosecutions, the scale of the task made it sensible that a special prosecutor be appointed specifically to handle the Fitzgerald-related prosecutions.

Cabinet Decision 55296 contains the initial policy proposal. A decision was deferred to 17 October 1988 and (in Cabinet Decision 55307) again until 24 October 1988. Cabinet Decision 55354 contains a draft bill, but Attorney-General Clauson had a number of reservations about the bill. Two in particular are of note:

First, Mr Fitzgerald considered that the Special Prosecutor should be entirely independent of the Attorney-General, while the Attorney-General was concerned that this would require him to have *political* accountability for a special prosecutor he could not actually influence. In the end, a compromise solution was reached whereby the Attorney-General could “give directions or furnish guidelines” to the special prosecutor, but these had to be in writing (and subsequently published in the *Gazette*), and they could not relate to a particular prosecution.

Second, it is a fundamental principle of natural justice that an accused person should have access to the case against them; however in a situation like that confronting Fitzgerald, where the investigation was into corruption (which flourishes in secrecy) there was a danger that disclosure of confidential material to defendants may compromise the ongoing Inquiry, or indeed other prosecutions. Again, a compromise was reached, allowing defendants to seek an order granting access to specific materials, or allowing them to seek an admission by the prosecutor that certain facts are true, without evidence being adduced.

Hon. Doug Drummond QC was appointed as special prosecutor, and conducted dozens of prosecutions, including that of Terry Lewis and overseeing that of Joh Bjelke-Petersen. He later served as a Federal Court judge.

Queensland Police History Book

TITLE: *Department of Police – Production of a Book on the History of the Queensland Police Force*

Date	12/12/1988	Decision #	55777	Minister	Bill Gunn
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Police Minister Bill Gunn had an unusual relationship with the Queensland Police Force in 1988.

He had been the instigator of the Fitzgerald Inquiry (as Acting Premier in Premier Bjelke-Petersen's absence in the days after the ABC screening of *The Moonlight State*, and under sustained pressure from Phil Dickie's articles in the *Courier Mail*). He had publicly declared his intention to remain in politics and as Police Minister only until the end of the Inquiry. During 1988, he fractured the relationship by publicly accusing police of being "fat and lazy".

With this in mind, it is somewhat wry that in 1986, before *The Moonlight State* and the revelations of decades of corruption in the Queensland Police Force, the government agreed to appoint historian Ross Johnston to write a largely adulatory history of the police force. In this decision, Cabinet is asked to agree to the expenditure of over \$70,000 for printing costs, which were intended to be recouped by sale of the books.

A decision was deferred on this occasion, and Johnston's work was ultimately published as *The Long Blue Line* in 1992.

Neighbourhood Watch

TITLE: *Department of Police – Proposed Establishment of a Neighbourhood Watch Programme in Queensland*

Date	2/6/1988	Decision #	54425	Minister	Bill Gunn
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Neighbourhood watch, a co-operative partnership between local communities and the Queensland police, is now a customary part of Queensland's law-enforcement landscape. In 1988, Queensland was the only state without a Neighbourhood watch scheme.

In this decision, Cabinet agreed to establish a large-scale pilot project, involving 100 neighbourhood watch groups in the first year, and 100 in the second year of operation.

There are now over 470 neighbourhood watch groups active in Queensland, according to the Queensland Police 2017/2018

Public Accounts Committee

TITLE: *The Establishment of a Public Accounts Committee in Queensland*

Date	19/5/1988	Decision #	53606	Minister	Brian Austin
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A Public Accounts Committee is a committee of the Parliament established to investigate the spending of public money by the executive Government. Along with auditing by the Auditor General and more politically-charged accountability in the budget Estimates process, it forms part of the mechanism by which the Parliament can hold the executive government accountable for its spending.

Prior to the Ahern government, Queensland had no Public Accounts Committee, and some of the Fitzgerald revelations during 1988 (particularly in relation to the business dealings of former "Minister for Everything" Russ Hinze) made it clear that a Public Accounts Committee was a vital reform.

The Public Accounts Committee (PAC) was one of the few Ahern-era reforms which endured past the implementation of the Fitzgerald Report. Indeed, the Committee is still with us in its modern iteration as the Public Accounts and Public Works Committee.

It is clear from this report that the PAC was not intended as a rubber stamp; the Cabinet appears to be genuine and diligent in its efforts to establish a genuine institution of accountability. The greatest cloud hanging over this observation, however, is the composition of the Committee.

It would be quite normal for a Public Accounts Committee of seven to include four members from the government and three from the opposition. However, given that the National/Liberal coalition in Queensland has split in 1983, the Liberals could not be considered a Government party. The result, in this submission, was that they were given one of the Opposition seats. This had the effect of reducing the ALP membership to just two, meaning that the Committee could reach its quorum for both debate and deliberation without any members of the Opposition being present.

Overall, however, this Cabinet Submission represents the commencement of an important and enduring reform in Queensland.

Public Works Committee

TITLE: *Establishment of a Public Works Committee*

Date	21/11/1988	Decision #	55595	Minister	Mike Ahern
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During 1988, the Ahern Government established a Public Accounts Committee in Queensland, with the capacity to look into government expenditure (see [Cabinet Decision 54321](#)). A public accounts committee, however, is inherently limited to examining actual financial transactions.

The Public Works Committee, on the other hand, was implemented in order to provide an accountability mechanism for the tendering process, to ensure that government work was allocated to service providers on the basis of the best value for money for the Queensland public rather than (for example) as a result of patronage or corruption.

Legislation for the Public Works Committee was not ready during 1988. The Public Works Committee is still in existence, having now been merged with the Public Accounts Committee to form the Public Accounts and Public Works Committee.

Foreign Land Investment

TITLE: *Foreign Investment – A Land Register*

Date	7/6/1988	Decision #	54428	Minister	Bill Glasson
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The foreign ownership of land – residential land and houses – was as contentious in 1988 as it is today, however in 1988 the key concern was the purchase of land by Japanese interests, rather than by Chinese interests as is currently the case.

The issue presented a number of difficulties for the state government. Public opinion on the issue was strong and there was a need for the government to appear to act, but the Commonwealth government held all the constitutional cards. The powers of state governments were very limited, and the “heavy lifting” of policy was being undertaken by the Commonwealth’s Foreign Investment Review Board.

In addition, governments at both levels saw the need for balance. There was a strong undercurrent of public sentiment against the foreign ownership of land; however at the same time it was in the nation’s economic interests to welcome in foreign investment, and the economic growth which would accompany such investment.

A land register was a reasonable compromise. A register enables the State Government to appear to be managing the quantity of foreign ownership of land, and provides a basis for evidence-based policymaking by governments at both levels, while not actually restraining any foreign investment or crossing into the territory of the Foreign Investment Review Board.

The relevant legislation, the *Foreign Ownership of Land Register Act 1988*, remains in force.

Police Complaints Tribunal

TITLE: *Transfer of responsibility for the Police complaints Tribunal*

Date	22/2/1988	Decision #	53606	Minister	Gunn & Clauson
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This cabinet decision is very short, but nevertheless represents a watershed for Queensland. During the Fitzgerald Inquiry it became very clear that the Police Complaints Tribunal was utterly compromised, with the result that Caesar was judging Caesar. Various attempts during the 1970s and 1980s were made to investigate the Force from without, but none of these were successful due to the highly organised nature of police corruption, particularly after Terry Lewis was appointed as Commissioner.

This Cabinet Decision transfers the Police Complaints Tribunal from the Police portfolio to the Justice portfolio, and gives as the reason that it "should be perceived to possess an appropriate degree of independence from the Police Force."

This reform was short lived, as it was overtaken by Fitzgerald's recommendations and the Goss government's implementation of the Criminal Justice Commission (CJC, later the Crime and Misconduct Commission (CMC), and currently the Crime and Corruption Commission (CCC)). However it remains an important example of Premier Ahern's attempts to commence the reform process in Queensland as soon as possible, rather than allowing the system to continue until Tony Fitzgerald completed his report.

Public Service Pay Reform

TITLE: *Public Service Salary Administration System and Contract Arrangements for Senior Public Servants*

Date	10/10/1988	Decision #	55294	Minister	Brian Austin
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This Cabinet decision contains the primary discussion material on this issue, but the actual decision was made in Cabinet Decision 55306, one week later.

By tradition, public servants in Westminster-style governments are servants of the crown, who are appointed under a piece of legislation and who have tenure in their positions (in other words, they can only be dismissed under relatively narrow circumstances). The reason for this approach is that it protects the public service from politicisation, and enables the public service (theoretically) to provide frank and fearless advice to the government, regardless of which political party forms government.

The opposite approach is that seen in, for instance, the United States of America, where the public service is highly politicised, and each incoming government had the opportunity to appoint a large number of its own supporters to civil service positions.

In Australia in the last few decades, most governments have sought a middle ground. The more senior public servants have been offered contracts rather than security of tenure, with the implicit consequence that incoming governments will be able to choose their own public service leadership.

There are, of course, pros and cons of each of these arrangements. In this Cabinet Decision, those pros and cons are not discussed: it is essentially already understood that the seniormost public servants will transition to contracts, and this decision examines the mechanisms for doing so most effectively.

Ministerial Accountability

TITLE: *Accountability for Ministerial Expenses*

Date	21/11/1988	Decision #	55594	Minister	Mike Ahern
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This is perhaps the shortest, and yet one of the more significant Cabinet decisions of 1988.

The Public Accounts Committee which Cabinet agreed to establish in Cabinet Decision 54321 was initially restricted in that it could examine *departmental* expenditure but not *ministerial* expenditure. Perhaps unsurprisingly, this limitation was strenuously criticised by the opposition and the media.

All of this occurred at a time when former Premier Bjelke-Petersen and former Minister Russ Hinze had appeared before the Fitzgerald Inquiry and found their Ministerial expenses under considerable scrutiny.

This cabinet decision represents the government's response: The Public Accounts Committee would still be restricted to examining departmental expenditure only, but Minister would be required to table their Ministerial expenses in Parliament.

Gun laws

TITLE: *Department of Police – Firearms and Offensive Weapons Act
Amendment Bill 1988*

Date	18/2/1988	Decision #	53576	Minister	Bill Gunn
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Before the tragic mass shooting at Port Arthur, there were the similarly awful events in Melbourne during 1987. The Hoddle Street mass shootings left six dead, and the Queen Street mass shootings left nine dead. In the aftermath of these events, the governments of NSW and Victoria tightened gun laws, in particular banning large calibre semi-automatic weapons.

This led to a concern that such weapons would flood into Queensland, where they remained legal. It was therefore necessary for Cabinet to consider whether Queensland's law should be similarly tightened. In this decision, Cabinet considers some of the complications of the gun law debate as it stood in 1988, in terms of potential community backlash, but also the potential costs of compensating lawful gun owners whose weapons were banned (after Port Arthur, a special levy on taxpayers was required to fund a buy-back scheme).

Cabinet decided, as a result, to adopt a wait-and-see position, watching the laws operate in the southern states, before moving to actually impose bans.

At the same time, an Australian company named Australian Automatic Arms released a semi-automatic rifle with a removable stock, which would make it easily concealable. Such a weapon was already unlawful in Queensland, and authorities rapidly moved to prevent their introduction. Australian Automatic Arms then redesigned the rifle to make it compliant with Queensland law.

Corrective Services Inquiry

Date	29/2/1988	Decision #	53652	Minister	Russell Cooper
Title	<i>Commission of Review into Corrective Services in Queensland</i>				
Date	3/10/1988	Decision #	55216	Minister	Russell Cooper
Title	<i>Commission of Review into Corrective Services in Queensland</i>				
Date	24/10/1988	Decision #	55402	Minister	Russell Cooper
Title	<i>Corrective Services Bill (etc)</i>				

While the Fitzgerald Inquiry was always going to overshadow other concurrent reform processes, 1988 was a momentous year for Corrective Services in Queensland. Boggo Road prison, in Dutton Park close to the city centre, was more than a century old, hopelessly antiquated and cruel. It included notorious "black hole" cells under the main oval where prisoners were confined in unsanitary, pitch-dark conditions.

In February 1988, a guard shot a prisoner during an incident, and this set off a series of riots and hunger strikes. Striking prisoners took to the roof of Boggo Road prison, where they could be seen from the surrounding suburbs, holding signs made from bedlinen demanding an end to torture in the prison.

Minister Russell Cooper announced an independent review of Corrective Services in Queensland, to be headed by Jim Kennedy CBE, whose background was primarily accountancy and board administration. His appointment, with a support panel including various voices but (a) no prisoner advocates and (b) no advocates from the Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander communities, is supported by cabinet in Cabinet Decision 53652.

Kennedy proved just the person for the job. His report pulled no punches, exposing Boggo Road as a "Relic of the last century ... hopelessly inadequate to provide corrective services today." He found that "management is lacking throughout the service." He found that security was lax, and that health services were inadequate. Kennedy proposed major structural reform, but also very practical measures such as extending the visiting hours for prisoners, automatically including time spent on remand as time served for the purpose of a sentence, and keeping children under the age of 18 out of adult prisons.

In Cabinet Decision 55216, Cabinet accepts the recommendations of the report, and in Cabinet Decision 55402, legislation is brought forward to give effect to many of those recommendations.

Prison Escapees

TITLE: *Reward for Recapture of Jail Escapees*

Date	3/10/1988	Decision #	55254	Minister	Russell Cooper
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On the evening of Friday 23 September 1988, five prisoners escaped from the maximum security wing of Boggo Road prison. They had assembled more than 70 bedsheets, cut them into strips to make rope, and then plaited and joined them to make a secure rope more than twenty metres long, which they used to abseil down the side of the building from the guards' catwalk.

Guards fired on the escapees, but to no avail, and it was suggested that the escape would have been impossible without assistance from corrupt guards in any event. The escapees included a rapist, an extortionist, two armed robbers and a heroin trafficker, serving sentences from 8 to 25 years.

Prisons Minister Russell Cooper was openly furious with prison authorities for allowing the escape. In front of media on a post-escape visit to the prison he asked prison staff "How the bloody hell were they able to get and hide that [rope]?"

Facing public outcry over the escape, Cabinet agreed in this decision to offer a reward of \$10,000 for reward leading to the recapture of each prisoner – a total reward of \$50,000.

Clemency for Prisoners

TITLE: *Royal Clemency for Prisoners – Visit by Her Majesty Queen Elizabeth II*

Date	21/3/1988	Decision #	53832	Minister	Russell Cooper
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During previous Royal Visits, such as the visit made by Her Majesty the Queen in 1982 to open the Commonwealth Games, prisoners had been granted clemency in relation to their sentences, in the form of (usually somewhat marginal) reductions in their sentence. This was an old tradition related to the Royal Prerogative of Mercy, which is a concept as old as the English Common Law.

In 1988, however, the Commonwealth and other states indicated that they would not be recommending to the Queen that she extend clemency to prisoners in those jurisdictions.

It was still not self-evident that Queensland might not unilaterally recommend clemency for Queensland prisoners – the Queen's visit to Australia in April 1988 was, after all, quite heavily focused on Queensland. However in the aftermath of prison riots and strikes, and with a review into prisons underway, clemency would likely have been quite politically charged. In this decision, Cabinet decides that royal clemency should not be granted to prisoners in Queensland in 1988.

Royal Commission into Aboriginal Deaths in Custody

Date	01/02/1988	Decision #	53434	Minister	Mr Ahern
Title	<i>Royal Commission into Aboriginal Deaths in Custody</i>				
Date	01/02/1988	Decision #	53439	Minister	Mr Cooper
Title	<i>Statistical Information on Aboriginals – Prisons Department</i>				
Date	08/02/1988	Decision #	53499	Minister	Mr Ahern
Title	<i>Royal Commission into Aboriginal Deaths in Custody</i>				
Date	18/02/1988	Decision #	53574	Minister	Mr Gunn
Title	<i>Royal Commission into Aboriginal Deaths in Custody</i>				
Date	03/05/1988	Decision #	54171	Minister	Mr Ahern
Title	<i>Royal Commission into Aboriginal Deaths in Custody</i>				
Date	03/05/1988	Decision #	54172	Minister	Ahern, Clauson
Title	<i>Royal Commission into Aboriginal Deaths in Custody</i>				
Date	04/07/1988	Decision #	54620	Minister	Ahern, Clauson
Title	<i>Royal Commission into Aboriginal Deaths in Custody</i>				
Date	04/07/1988	Decision #	54654	Minister	Ahern, Gunn
Title	<i>Royal Commission into Aboriginal Deaths in Custody</i>				
Date	18/07/1988	Decision #	54733	Minister	Mr Ahern
Title	<i>Royal Commission into Aboriginal Deaths in Custody</i>				

Cabinet decided on 3 September 1987 (Decision No. 52391), that Queensland would co-operate with the Royal Commission into Aboriginal Deaths in Custody. Letters Patent were approved by Governor in Council on 29 October 1987. In decision 53434, Cabinet decided that the Honourable the Premier and Treasurer write to Mr. Justice Muirhead indicating that:

(i) Queensland was prepared to withdraw the Letters Patent for the Royal Commission into Aboriginal Deaths in Custody and issue new Letters Patent to Mr Justice Muirhead and two or, if necessary, three additional Commissioners containing the following provisions – that Justice Muirhead be Chairman of the Commission; and, all Commissioners be empowered to sit independently on inquiries as and when directed by the Chairman,

(ii) Queensland had no objection to deaths in hospitals being regarded as outside the Terms of Reference of the Commission.

Decision 53439 established approval to (a) permit the Prisons Department to retain a record of aboriginal persons held in custody; and (b) permitting such information to be released publicly as deemed desirable by the Honourable the Minister for Corrective Services and Administrative Services.

Decision 53499 allowed for the Queensland Government to provide office accommodation comprising two rooms in a State Government office and appropriate office furniture, to enable the Commission to establish an office in Queensland.

Decision 53574 provided approval for the request from the Royal Commission into Aboriginal Deaths in Custody that the Queensland Government provide the Commission with a list of all deaths in custody which had occurred in Queensland post 1 January 1980.

Decision 54171 advised that hearings into deaths in custody in Queensland would commence as early as June 1988.

Decision 54172 noted that the Honourable the Premier and Treasurer and Minister for Arts write to the Honourable the Prime Minister indicating that: -

(a) Queensland raised no objection to the appointment of Mr. Lewis Wyvill, Q.C. as an additional Commissioner to assist the Muirhead Royal Commission in relation to the investigation of deaths in custody in Queensland within the terms of reference of the Inquiry; and, that (b) Queensland would issue new Letters Patent for the Royal Commission into Aboriginal Deaths in Custody, in similar terms to the Commonwealth Letters Patent.

Decision 54620 resolved to not approve the submission that the State Government be responsible for legal costs to fund representation for members of the Queensland Police Union of Employees and the Queensland Police Officers Union of Employees before the Royal Commission into Aboriginal Deaths in Custody by an experienced junior Counsel and Solicitor, to include necessary costs of travel and accommodation away from Brisbane.

Decision 54654 resolved that:

1. The Queensland Royal Commission into Aboriginal Deaths in Custody be advised that the Queensland Government was not able to second two police officers to the Commission.
2. That the Royal Commission be advised that while it was not proposed to allocate members of the Queensland Police Force to perform duties at the Office of the Royal Commission itself, a Police Unit of no more than six Police Officers, as required, would be made available to the State's legal advisers to carry out relative legal functions and associated matters, as required by the Royal Commission, which were related to the Police Department's responsibilities.
3. That the procedure would be that the requests of the Royal Commission in that regard be transmitted to the Police Department through the Solicitor-General's Office.
4. That Ministers and Departmental representatives refrained from commenting to the media about matters before the Royal Commission into Aboriginal Deaths in Custody without first seeking the advice of the State Government's legal advisers.

Decision 54733 resolved that the Royal Commission into Aboriginal Deaths in Custody be advised that the Queensland Government would pay witness expenses of State officials and former State officials appearing as witnesses before the Commission. Further, that Departments were to make every endeavour to meet witness expenses from within their normal allocations but that, where costs could not be met, the Cabinet Budget Committee would consider requests for funding in the normal manner.

Liquor Trading During Expo

TITLE: *Liquor Trading – World Expo 88*

Date	29/2/1988	Decision #	53641	Minister	Mike Ahern
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During the 1982 Commonwealth Games, Brisbane had experimented successfully with 24 hour liquor licencing, in order to capitalise on the festival atmosphere of the games. Approaching Expo, licence holders were understandably keen to maximise their profits from Expo visitors.

There were however a number of differences. For one thing, the allowable Blood Alcohol Limit during the Commonwealth Games in 1982 was 0.08 (the maximum allowable BAC was lowered to 0.05 on 1 December 1982), and perhaps more importantly, the Commonwealth Games ran for just ten days, while Expo ran for six months. From the 2018 perspective, it is also notable that Random Breath Testing was not yet undertaken in Queensland (it commenced later in 1988).

It is clear from this cabinet decision, and from Cabinet Decision 53847 which enclosed the bill itself, that the social implications of extended drinking hours were a key consideration for Cabinet, both in terms of the road toll, and in terms of other forms of antisocial behaviour associated with drinking. It was therefore necessary to support the introduction of 24-hour liquor licencing with a number of control measures: additional policing measures, and the requirement for licensees to apply for the extended trading hours (the extension was not automatic).

At the same time, Cabinet funded a study to be undertaken by the University of Queensland to examine the impact of extended drinking hours. This study was to be considered during the (inevitable) request by vested interests to maintain the extended hours after the Expo period.

More recent policy, of course, has proceeded in the other direction, with the implementation of lock-out laws and restrictions on the sale of rapid intoxication beverages.

Queensland Day at Expo

TITLE: *Funding for Queensland Day at World Expo 88*

Date	15/2/1988	Decision #	53565	Minister	Mike Ahern
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While 1988 was the year of Expo, the Cabinet-level decision-making in relation to Expo had largely been done in previous years. One exception was the development of appropriate festivities to observe Queensland Day on June 6 at Expo. A feature of Expo was signature days conducted by exhibitors on their national days.

Queensland day itself was somewhat controversial in 1988, having been observed only since 1981, and initially characterised by the opposition as something of a political stunt.

At Expo, Queensland Day was to be observed by a series of three concerts: A youth concert on June 4, a family concert on June 5, and a Royal Command performance, before the Duke and Duchess of Kent, on June 6. This Cabinet Decision outlines the contractual arrangements for that performance, along with the initially proposed performers. The performers had an emphasis on Queensland and Australian performers, as might be expected for a Queensland concert, but the headline performer for the whole venture was John Denver. Other performers such as Col Joye, Normie Rowe, Gerry Connolly, and the Eurogliders also performed.

The Cabinet papers show that fundraising for the event had become more difficult than expected, partly due to funding fatigue on the part of corporate Queensland, which had been called on to sponsor more events than usual in 1988. The result was that the government ended up footing more of the bill than initially anticipated.

A related decision is Cabinet Decision 54135, in which Cabinet specifically invited Kamahl to perform at the Royal Command performance. While Kamahl was unable to perform on that occasion, he did perform (with the Australian Boys Choir) at Expo on another occasion. Kamahl had been a surprise omission from the Bicentennial Concert in Sydney earlier in the year, having penned a new song for the occasion and then not been invited to perform it.

The concert series at Expo went ahead and was widely regarded as successful.

Queensland Pavilion at Expo

TITLE: Queensland Pavilion – World Expo 88

Date	21/11/1988	Decision #	55562	Minister	Mike Ahern
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It is impossible not to note the tones of triumph in this cabinet submission, which informs Cabinet about the success of the Queensland Pavilion at Expo 88. However, for those of us old enough to remember the Expo, the triumph was genuinely earned. The Pavilion was based on a series of theatrettes and dioramas highlighting different aspects of Queensland, and visitors moved through in driverless “people movers”, 50 or so visitors at a time.

The submission notes that the Queensland Pavilion received 4.8 million visitors, or 31% of the paid throughput of Expo. Given that many of the visitors would have held season passes or three-day passes, the result is that virtually all visitors to Expo went to the Queensland pavilion. In fact, lines for the pavilion were often over one hour’s wait.

50,000 Commercially Important People or Very Important People attended special facilities in the pavilion during Expo, with the result of more than \$400 Million in identifiable investment arising from Expo.

Astonishingly, the pavilion came in well under budget; the cabinet decision notes a surplus of \$2 Million (although it is not clear whether this is a surplus as such, or rather than the pavilion operated at \$2 Million less than its budget).

While the Expo rules do not allow for judgment of the best pavilion, the cabinet decision notes a range of exit surveys and media judgments which held the Queensland Pavilion to be the pick of the Expo. Impressionistically, this was the view held by most Queenslanders who visited expo at the time: the Queensland, Australia, and Canada pavilions were almost certainly the most popular.

This cabinet decision provides, for Cabinet, the capstone on Expo itself, as attention then turned more fully to the process of redeveloping South Bank.

Gift to Parliament House Canberra

TITLE: *Queensland Government Gift to the New National Parliament House*

Date	22/2/1988	Decision #	53593	Minister	Mike Ahern
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Australia's federal parliament sat in Melbourne from 1901 to 1927, and then in a "temporary" parliamentary building for six decades from 1928 until 1988. In 1988, the magnificent new building was due to be opened by Her Majesty the Queen during her visit to Australia.

It is customary for other governments to send a gift to mark such an occasion, and the new parliament house received a number of beautiful gifts from the states, but also from other democratic nations. It was therefore appropriate for Queensland to send a gift.

In this decision, Cabinet decided that Queensland's gift would be a sculpture for the national gardens, by renowned Queensland sculptor Tom Risley (1947-2010).

A picture of the sculpture, which still stands in the gardens of Parliament House, is attached by courtesy of the Commonwealth Department of Parliamentary Services.

Post Expo Site Development

TITLE: *Post-expo redevelopment: Evaluations of expressions of interest*

Date	Decision #	Minister
1/2/1988	53444	Mike Ahern

From the time the *Expo 88 Act 1984* was first passed and planning began in earnest for Expo, government realised that the expo site would offer an unprecedented opportunity to redevelop what had become a run-down area within potential walking distance of the Brisbane CBD. Financial planning for Expo itself relied on the revenue expected from the sale of this site for redevelopment (although in the end, Expo was financially successful in its own right).

In this Cabinet Decision, taken three months before Expo even opened, Cabinet assesses the four most viable expressions of interest for consortia hoping to redevelop the site. It is clear from the decision that the key considerations for the assessment were (a) the financial return to the Queensland government arising from each development; (b) the potential benefits in terms of the generation of economic activity; and (c) continued public access to the riverbank in a way that was not possible on the north bank of the river, except on Gardens Point.

Two great unknowns also hovered over the selection process: whether the site would include a casino, either before or after 1992 (when state government agreements to allow the Jupiters Casino exclusivity in the Brisbane area expired); and whether a World Trade Centre would be built on the site by Frickers, the company which held the exclusive Australian licence to build a World Trade Centre.

The successful nominee, the River City Consortium, proposed a design with substantial public space. The design would have completely remodelled the south bank of the river, creating an artificial island upon which large office block would have stood.

The key problem with this Cabinet Decision is what was absent: public participation in the selection process. As later decisions on this topic will show, this became a substantial political issue and ultimately led to the demise of the original River City proposal.

Post Expo Site Development

TITLE: *Post Expo redevelopment*

Date	7/6/1988	Decision #	54470	Minister	Mike Ahern
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Following the award of preferred developer status to the River City Consortium (in Cabinet Decision 53444), the government, the Brisbane City Council, and the Expo Authority entered into negotiations to advance the proposal.

Unfortunately, negotiations did not go well. Deadlines were missed on a number of occasions, and ultimately Cabinet Decision 53963 left the timing of negotiations to the discretion of the Premier.

The Premier's close involvement in these negotiations led to a number of concerns.

First, he became concerned that the State Government itself had become responsible for these negotiations, whereas the *Expo 88 Act 1984* envisaged them being conducted by the Expo Authority which would then report to government. Expo Chairman Sir Llew Edwards agreed, and this decision contains correspondence between Sir Llew and Premier Ahern.

Second, while in Cabinet Decision 53444 it appeared that the Casino and world Trade Centre would be bonuses increasing the return of the proposal, during the negotiations it became clear that the proposal was fundamentally predicated upon the location of a casino on South Bank, and that River City hoped to bolster their attractiveness as a World Trade Centre site by locking in state government tenancies in the World Trade Centre building.

Third, it became clear that the consortium had not given sufficient attention to the City Council's requirements, and that this would result in delays.

All of this occurred against a backdrop of public concern that there had been insufficient public involvement in the selection process. The result was a decision to revoke preferred developer status for River City, and to invite fresh expressions of interest for redevelopment of the site.

The next step in this process came in Cabinet Decision 55547.

Post Expo Site Development

TITLE: *Post Expo redevelopment of South Bank*

Date	14/11/1988	Decision #	55547	Minister	Mike Ahern
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The demise of the River City proposal for South Bank (described in Cabinet Decisions 53444 and 54470) occurred during the height of Expo itself. Public support for, and enjoyment of Expo was at its peak, and Brisbane residents had developed a sense of fondness and ownership for the Expo area. The result was public criticism of the River City proposal, but also public criticism of any plan which would result in the return of the South Bank precinct to its previous status of commercial space. There was considerable demand for the area to remain a public precinct.

It was also clear by this point that Expo would be financially successful, which relieved pressure on the sale of lands.

The Premier responded to the public pressure – it would seem without any reference to Cabinet – by announcing, together with the Expo Authority Chairman and the Lord Mayor of Brisbane, the formation of the South Bank Development Corporation, a statutory body formally created under the *South Bank Development Corporation Act 1989*.

This corporation would take control of the Expo precinct, and work to develop the area along principles outlined in this Cabinet Decision: essentially a balance between public space, commercial use, and high density residential precincts, but within a wider plan for the South Brisbane-West End precinct, extending well beyond the boundaries of the Expo site itself.

Public consultation was to be a crucial part of the planning for South Bank (unlike the previous proposal, from which the public were largely excluded).

The original conceptual plan, included in this Cabinet Submission, is identifiably similar to South Bank, particularly in its earlier stages of evolution. The South Bank Development Corporation remains responsible for the precinct (although planning responsibility now rests with the Brisbane City Council), and has implemented Master Plans for the site in 1992 and 1997.

Monorail proposal

TITLE: *Proposed Monorail Investigation*

Date	27/6/1988	Decision #	54603	Minister	Bill Gunn
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The Monorail system which ran in a loop between the Vulture Street and South Brisbane ends of Expo was a very popular feature of the Expo itself, with large numbers of people travelling on the monorail simply to experience it as a form of travel. It is not difficult to see why a proposal to build a new monorail system in Brisbane to link the CBD and the new South Bank had at least sentimental support.

Sydney city was in the final stages of building its monorail loop between the CBD and Darling Harbour (the Sydney monorail opened in July 1988 and continued to operate until 2013), and so there may have been an undercurrent of interstate rivalry to the decision.

This Cabinet Decision does not reveal the reason why Minister Gunn's proposal was not accepted, but given that the future of the Expo site was in a state of flux at the time, it would have made sense for the government to wait before spending money surveying a project of this type. The decision proved prescient, as the Sydney monorail became more of a novelty than a genuine transport solution, and the lower-technology, lower-cost options of the Goodwill Bridge (opened 2001) and Kurilpa Bridge (opened 2009), combined with the busway across the Victoria Bridge, and the rail link between Central/Roma St and South Brisbane/South Bank have linked the CBD and South Bank in an enduring way.

Climate Change

TITLE: *The Greenhouse Effect Implications for Queensland*

Date	Decision #	Minister
25/01/1988	53348	Mr M.J. Ahern and Mr G.H. Muntz

In 1985, a Global Warming Conference was held in Villach, Austria and the "Villach Statement" was produced. The Villach Statement described the proven and accepted science of global warming and gave recommendations for tackling the rising challenge.

The Australian Environment Council responded to the Villach Statement, and the CSIRO conducted an assessment of anticipated regional climate changes expected in Australia. The CSIRO Report predicted temperature increases of 2-4 degrees, more frequent extreme events, salinity problems inland, and sea level rise among other changes.

Cabinet decided to establish a committee to coordinate with the State Government and the Federal Government. The composition of the committee was later determined in Cabinet Decision 53520. This committee would be assessing the presently known knowledge, establishing what further knowledge was required and creating working groups to immediately begin attending to Queensland's coastal development, water resources and primary industries.

Wet Tropics

TITLE: *World Heritage Nomination of the Wet Tropics – Progress Report*

Date	23/5/1988	Decision #	54335	Minister	Mr G.H. Muntz
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In 1987 the Commonwealth Government of Australia nominated areas of North Queensland for World Heritage Listing. This decision reports on the attendance of the International Union for Conservation of Nature and Natural Resources (IUCN) to evaluate the Wet Tropics World Heritage nomination.

The Queensland Government maintained strong objection to the World Heritage Nomination and took this opportunity to advise the IUCN Delegation as such. The grounds for the Queensland Government opposition were that there was inadequate consultation, inadequate scientific and technical data to support the nomination, inadequate regard to State rainforest management arrangements, social and economic dislocation and abuse of Constitutional powers.

Cabinet decided in Decision 53984 that a Queensland delegation would visit Paris in June in conjunction with a meeting of the Bureau of the World Heritage Committee. The Delegation that were set to attend Paris were given a clear message for the Bureau. Cabinet decided that the nomination for World Heritage Listing would not be supported unless;

1. Bans on logging be repealed,
2. Queensland Government be properly consulted and endorse the nomination,
3. The State remains the primary management authority, and
4. The Commonwealth commit necessary funding.

Wet Tropics

TITLE: *Department of Environment, Conservation and Tourism – World Heritage Listing of the North Queensland Rainforests*

Date	8/8/1988	Decision #	54860	Minister	Mr G.H. Muntz
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In Cabinet Decision 54591 the Minister for Environment, Conservation and Tourism, Minister Geoff Muntz, reported on what had transpired since he had returned from the visit to the IUCN, Paris. In Paris, the Bureau had stated that it would be recommending to the IUCN Committee that the wet tropics be inscribed on the World Heritage List. The Bureau had provided that any further submissions relating to this recommendation were due before 1 October 1988.

The IUCN Bureau had additionally recommended that State Government support and cooperation with the Commonwealth Government was essential to Nomination. In preparation for further negotiations with the Commonwealth, Cabinet decided that the primary position to maintain was that;

1. The timber industry must be allowed to continue,
2. Boundaries must be discussed and then the management,
3. A concession be made and the State agree to a heritage area of 211,000,
4. The Queensland Government will have the sole management of the area,
5. If a further concession was absolutely required, a joint Federal and State Management Council could be formed with a Queensland Minister as Chairman.

Additionally, during the period between returning from Paris and the Cabinet meeting, Minister Geoff Muntz had travelled to Cairns to meet with the North Queensland local Shire Councils who were convinced to remain united in their resolve to retain the North Queensland timber industry.

Wet Tropics

TITLE: *Department of Environment Conservation and Tourism – Report on Commonwealth/State Negotiations on Proposed World Heritage Listing*

Date	5/9/1988	Decision #	55070	Minister	Mr G.H. Muntz
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Central to the Queensland Government's objection to the Wet Tropics World Heritage Listing was that the Commonwealth had interfered with State responsibilities without consultation. This theme was repeated throughout the year.

In May, Decision 54343, Cabinet took notice when the Commonwealth Government relied on powers prescribed by the *World Heritage Properties Conservation Act 1983* to interfere with the construction of a road in North Queensland. The Commonwealth introduced regulations designed to prevent the construction of Quaid Road, a 32km road stretching through areas of proposed Wet Tropics World Heritage Area.

In September, discussions and negotiations were taking place between the State and Commonwealth. However, it appeared to Cabinet that a favourable compromise was not forthcoming. Cabinet resolved in Decision 55070 that the State must stand its ground on the issue of management, and that if the Commonwealth would not cooperate, that the State would not support the Commonwealth management of the World Heritage Area.

In October, Cabinet Decision 55260, considering the submissions made in Decision 55249, Cabinet reaffirmed the State's objection to the unilateral action of the Commonwealth Government to nominate Queensland land for inclusion in the World Heritage List. This was seen as a Commonwealth attack on State rights, and that all States must be informed and consulted with regard to potential action.

The IUCN were reluctant to comment on the internal squabbling and many IUCN Committee members were hesitant to hear directly from the Queensland State Government. Queensland maintained their objection to this blight on State rights and were committed to ensuring it would not happen again.

Wet Tropics

TITLE: *World Heritage Committee Meeting - Brasilia*

Date	12/12/1988	Decision #	55757	Minister	Mr G.H. Muntz
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By the end of 1988, the Commonwealth and State had not progressed toward consensus. At the start of the year, the focus for Cabinet had been on securing public support for the State position. By the end of the year, the Queensland Government was lobbying directly with the World Heritage Committee Members themselves.

The World Heritage Committee were meeting in Brasilia in early December 1988. Decision 55571 records that the Queensland delegation would be seeking that the Committee defer its decision on the Wet Tropics nomination. This request would rely on the continuing High Court case, new scientific expert evidence, disagreement about management and the loss of a well-managed timber industry.

On return from Brasilia Mr Muntz reports on the difficulties meeting with the IUCN members in Paris, representatives in Canada, USA and Mexico, and finally the meeting in Brasilia. Any lobbying attempted was generally unsuccessful and in Brasilia the World Heritage Listing was approved by the Committee.

Cyclone Charlie

TITLE: *Cyclone Charlie*

Date	7/3/1988	Decision #	53714	Minister	Mr M.J. Ahern
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On 29 February and 1 March 1988, Cyclone Charlie made landfall at Upstart Bay near Ayr, south of Townsville. Population density in this area is low and structural damage was minimal. However, this is important agricultural land and associate flooding caused approximately \$15 million (1990) worth of crop losses. Additionally, preliminary estimates indicated that \$5.75 million would be required to repair public assets including roads and bridges that had been damaged.

Cabinet declared Cyclone Charlie a natural disaster event and thus State and Commonwealth Natural Disaster Relief Arrangements became available. Minister Neville Harper, Minister for Primary Industries, personally visited affected areas and reported to Cabinet. As a result of this report Cabinet decided that it was imperative secure Commonwealth Government disaster assistance, as recorded by Cabinet Decision 53715.

For the next 4 weeks, Cabinet received weekly updates on the scope of damage and loss suffered as a result, Cabinet Decisions 53787, 53819, 53891, and 53958. The situation was complicated by the pre-existing and continuing drought that affected areas surrounding the cyclone zone. While some areas were now flooded, surrounding areas continued to experience severe drought. Remaining properly informed cabinet continued drought support while responding to Cyclone Charlie.

Crocodile farming

Date	15/2/1988	Decision #	53560	Minister	Geoff Muntz
Title	<i>Department of Environment, Conservation and Tourism – Moratorium on the Establishment of New Crocodile Farms</i>				
Date	14/3/1988	Decision #	53788	Minister	Geoff Muntz
Title	<i>Green Paper – Sale of Crocodile and Other Game Meat for Human consumption</i>				

Australian native meats such as kangaroo and crocodile are nowadays unremarkable delicacies. Most supermarkets stock kangaroo meat for human consumption. However in 1988, the sale of crocodile and other game meats was still controversial, partly because of the impact the sale of those meats may have on the suppliers of more traditional meats (who were also key supporters of the ruling National Party).

In Cabinet Decision 53560, cabinet noted that since the start of commercial farming of crocodiles (for their skins), the number of large crocodiles in the wild in coastal river systems (where they might encounter humans) was now very low – so low that it was unwise to allow the commencement of any other crocodile farms relying on wild-caught animals as breeding stock. A moratorium on the commencement of new farms was therefore imposed. It was also clear from this decision that Cabinet was not inclined to allow crocodiles to be taken from remote areas, both for ecological reasons, but also in order to avoid conflict with the Commonwealth.

One of the natural by-products of this increase in crocodile farming was a desire on the part of some farmers to sell meat from their farmed crocodiles. At the same time, there was a push for the commercial sale of wild-shot game meats such as kangaroo and wild pig. In Cabinet Decision 53788, Minister Muntz brought forward a green paper which sought to canvass public opinion about these matters. Cabinet agreed only to release a green paper regarding game meat, and not crocodile meat.

Even the proposal for discussion of game meat was soon dropped: just three days after this Cabinet decision, in the Legislative Assembly during Question Time, Minister Muntz stated that the government had no intention of allowing the sale of kangaroo meat for human consumption.

Hazardous Waste Site in Logan City

TITLE: *Hazardous Waste Site, Diamond St, Kingston*

Date	21/3/1988	Decision #	53816	Minister	Mike Ahern
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From 1939 until 1955, gold mining (both underground and open cut) was conducted on Mt Taylor, a large hill adjacent to Kingston/Beenleigh Road in Kingston. From the late 1950s until the late 1960s, the mining lease holders allowed Mobil Oil to dump, in the former shafts, wastes produced during the refining process to reclaim usable oil from sump oil. Even after this time, there are (in effect) local legends of the shafts being used as an informal refuse pit.

After the cessation of mining activities the area was progressively subdivided, and between 1979 and 1983, houses were built over the old open cut mine pit and the waste slurry. Housing approvals were made with an understanding of the potential subsidence issues associated with building on rehabilitated mining land, but by 1982 residents began to notice caustic oily sludge rising to the surface of their land.

Testing showed that the substance was indeed toxic, and by 1986-87, pressure on the issue was sufficient that the Logan City Council offered to purchase a number of the affected sites, in order to undertake site rehabilitation. This was an expensive exercise, and the Council sought to fund the matter by issuing a writ against Mobil Oil, and by seeking a contribution from the state government.

In Cabinet Decision 53816, Cabinet agrees that a state contribution to the matter is appropriate, but there is concern about the spread of the contaminants beyond the immediate site of the pits, and the potential cost implications if the Cabinet set a political precedent by funding the first stage of rehabilitation. As a result, Cabinet sought to wait until further investigations were undertaken. By late August 1988, public pressure on the issue was growing, so in Cabinet Decision 55018, Cabinet agreed to contribute to the demolition and removal of affected houses, while still staying its hand in relation to land rehabilitation costs.

Ultimately a large area of the site was reclaimed and rehabilitated, at a cost of approximately \$8 million (Hansard, Mr Mackenroth, 5 June 1990, p. 2125).

HIV/AIDS

TITLE: *AIDS (Acquired Immune Deficiency Syndrome)*

Date	18/1/1988	Decision #	53319	Minister	Liesha Harvey
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HIV/AIDS was virtually unknown in Australia before 1982, but by the mid-1980s it had been recognised as potentially being a massive public health issue. The famous “grim reaper” television advertisement began in 1987.

This Cabinet decision represents an early proposal for a government-wide policy response to HIV. In some ways, it represents a progressive understanding of the issue of HIV/AIDS: the potential scale of the problem is recognised, and the primacy of prevention as a response strategy is emphasised. The submission also recognises consequential issues such as discrimination against HIV positive people and AIDS sufferers.

The detail of the response, however, shows how challenging the HIV epidemic was for a conservative government exercising conservative morality. Contraception was still a topic of some moral controversy in the 1980s, and the key defence against HIV – condoms – is mentioned only twice in this decision: once as a preventative measure, and then in more detail when the decision notes that the installation of condom vending machines was an offence.

More importantly, given that at this time HIV was a health issue largely confined to intravenous drug users and men who had sex with men, the decision appears largely bereft of any engagement with the gay and bisexual communities. There are no strategies in relation to bisexual men at all other than a vague concern that their female partners may not know they were at risk; and it was “understood” that “some” funding which had been provided to church organisations for community AIDS prevention would be used in relation to homosexual men.

There was no direct engagement with any gay advocacy organisations (the gay community was still largely in hiding, bearing in mind sodomy was still an offence in Queensland until 1991) and from the perspective of 2018, using church organisations to drive community health in the gay community seems positively bizarre.

HIV/AIDS

TITLE: *AIDS Control Queensland – Policy and Budgetary Submission*

Date	28/3/1988	Decision #	53885	Minister	Liesha Harvey
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This cabinet submission represents a more detailed program, building on Cabinet's in-principle support for decision [53319](#). The budget represents a massive expansion of state government spending in the fight against AIDS, contingent on it being matched by Commonwealth spending.

From the perspective of 2018, there are a number of notable features. At this stage, HIV/AIDS was still largely regarded as a disease affecting gay men, and there was an explicit policy of taking steps to prevent the spread of the disease into the “general heterosexual community.” From this perspective, the key policy measures discussed in the Cabinet submission are:

- Maintaining the integrity of the supply of blood for transfusions;
- Trying to engage with bisexual men; and
- Engaging with intravenous drug users.

The impact of Queensland's regressive policies on homosexuality are stark in this submission, where it is noted that the number of people with HIV or AIDS in Queensland could not be sensibly estimated because “certain legislative factors are suggested to inhibit members of risk groups presenting for testing”, which is code for the fact that the criminalisation of sodomy, together with the identification of HIV/AIDS as a “homosexual disease” and general social criticism of homosexuality inhibited gay men from presenting for testing.

It is also notable that all of the funding relating to gay men was directed to the Sisters of Mercy, rather than to any community group from within the LGBTI community.

HIV/AIDS

TITLE: *AIDS Control Queensland – Interdepartmental Action*

Date	28/3/1988	Decision #	53920	Minister	Leisha Harvey
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This decision was brought before Cabinet at the same meeting as Cabinet Decision 53885, which contains the broader policy, and both of these documents follow Cabinet Decision 53319, which gave the general principles for Queensland policy.

This decision broadens the scope of Queensland's response to the threat of an AIDS epidemic. It establishes a high level inter-departmental committee composed of senior public servants from seven public service departments:

- Employment, training and industrial affairs
- Education
- Family services
- Community Services
- Police
- Premier's Department
- Treasury

The committee was also to involve action from a range of other departments with more tangential (but still important) interest in the issue of HIV. The submission then goes into some detail, from the perspective of each department, about the implications of an AIDS epidemic for that area of policy, and the contribution to be made by each department to an interdepartmental, whole-of-government strategy.

One positive aspect of this strategy was the considerable attention given to reducing or preventing discrimination against HIV-positive people and those with AIDS, and to social strategies to meet their needs while also guarding against the proliferation of infection.

The criticisms relating to the strategy as a whole – particularly the failure to effectively engage with gay men – continue to apply to this decision and need not be repeated.

HIV/AIDS

TITLE: *Report on recommendations of the inter-departmental working party on AIDS control in Queensland*

Date	5/9/1988	Decision #	55026	Minister	Leisha Harvey
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Following the development of general policy in Cabinet Decision 53319 and the more detailed submission in Cabinet Decision 53885, an inter-departmental working group was established by Cabinet Decision 53920. This decision represents the first report of that working group. The report was initially brought before Cabinet on 15 August 1988, but Cabinet Decision 54913 deferred consideration of the report (essentially in order to allow for further discussions and amendments between the departments).

This decision is primarily notable for how much it does *not* do. While the cabinet documents contain only a summary of the report, the summary does little or nothing to advance the government's policy beyond the detailed expression of policy given by Minister Harvey in Cabinet Decision 53885.

Perhaps the most interesting point of note in this report is the apparent divergence between state and Commonwealth policies, particularly in relation to gay men. By 1988, homosexual sex was lawful in Victoria, New South Wales, South Australia, the ACT, and the Northern Territory. Commonwealth policy had been for the decriminalisation of homosexual sex since the early 1970s. As a result, Commonwealth-produced materials intended to raise HIV/AIDS and safer-sex awareness among gay and bisexual men could be targeted in a way that was contrary to Queensland law. The difficulty of coordinating a Commonwealth-state approach in this area of policy was highlighted in this Cabinet Decision.

HIV/AIDS (Needle exchange)

TITLE: *Needle and syringe availability and AIDS prevention: Modification to existing legislation*

Date	11/7/1988	Decision #	54693	Minister	Gunn/Clauson/Harvey
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The various Cabinet Decisions in relation to HIV/AIDS in 1988 were notable for the underlying attitude that HIV/AIDS was essentially a problem within the homosexual community, and that one effective social health measure would be to identify and control the means by which HIV could spread into what was euphemistically called the "general heterosexual community."

There were three of these potential crossover points: the sexual activity of bisexual men who hid their sexual activity with other men; prostitution; and intravenous drug use involving the sharing of needles.

In an early attempt to increase access to clean needles, the Queensland government had implemented a program which essentially allowed needles to be provided by chemists on prescription, but this program was a failure. Drug users were disinclined to use it as the process was not anonymous, and many doctors and pharmacists refused to participate.

This cabinet decision paved the way for a much broader needle exchange program, making it no longer an offence to possess needles and syringes, but making it an offence to supply these unless the supplier met with certain conditions.

This approach allowed for drug users to obtain clean needles confidentially, and also allowed for a broader range of people to be approved to supply needles. At the same time, the needle exchange process provided an opportunity to engage in public education about both addiction issues and HIV issues.

Such was the perceived urgency that this Cabinet decision was implemented immediately, even before the required legislation was able to be considered by the parliament. Technically, for a period of time, those supplying and possessing needles were engaged in offences, but the police had been instructed to look the other way.

Human Relationships Education

TITLE: *Submission on Interim Policy and Guidelines Statement on Human Relationships Education for Queensland Schools*

Date	07/11/1988	Decision #	55450	Minister	Mr B.G. Littleproud
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Human relationships education is concerned with helping young people participate effectively in our society. The role of Human Relationship Education in Schools involved consultation with parents and members of the community, as well as teachers in schools. These people assisted in making the curriculum relevant to the needs of young people in Queensland schools. Human relationships education was regarded as a partnership between the home and school.

The Department of Education was engaged in a process of developing and progressively implementing human relationships education in State schools beginning with a number of trial schools in 1989. It was intended to disseminate the interim Policy and Guidelines Statement to State schools before the end of 1988 and before the 1989 school year commenced. This was considered desirable for a number of reasons. Firstly, it was important that the Department's policy on human relationships education be made known to a wide audience of teachers, parents, young people and community members. Secondly, the Statement was required in order to provide necessary guidelines to those State schools who were to trial the human relationships education programs in 1989. Thirdly, it was hoped that fruitful discussion and further consultation would result assist in the writing of a final version of the Statement during 1989.

World's Tallest Building Proposal

TITLE: *Brisbane City Council v Mainsel Investments Pty Ltd and the Commissioner for Railways – Proposed Constitution Act*

Date	26/8/1988	Decision #	55016	Minister	Jim Randell
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One issue which had a very significant public and media profile during 1988, but which barely shows up in the Cabinet papers, is a proposal to build what would then have been the World's Tallest Building in the Brisbane CBD. The proposal seems to have drawn equal shares of excitement and derision from the public, particularly after an advertisement by the developers which purported to show the Brisbane skyline with the new building but which, it turned out, had been drawn from the perspective which would make the building least intrusive.

The project was on again and off again, and from a regulatory perspective was kicked between the State government and the City Council.

Finally, the Brisbane Town Plan was amended to place a limit on the height of new buildings in the CBD without council approval. As is customary under the Westminster system, where the Crown acts on the advice of the Ministry, the Governor received only a recommendation, and acted on that recommendation.

However, read literally, the relevant legislation required the Governor to personally consider all of the paperwork relating to a proposal to change the town plan – including all objections. The developer, Mainsel, went to the Supreme Court seeking to have the change invalidated. In the meanwhile, out of an abundance of caution, the state government did place all of the materials before the Governor, who duly made the decision requested.

The Supreme Court, in *Brisbane City Council v Mainsel Investments* (1989) 2 Qd R 204, found that the original decision had in fact been invalid. The Governor was, in fact, required to consider all documents. This led to a flurry of Cabinet activity, as steps were taken to retrospectively validate the many other decisions which, it turned out, had been taken improperly; and to change legislation so that the Governor would not be deluged in tens of thousands of pages of paper.

This Cabinet decision sets out the process for that Government response.

Cape York International Spaceport

Date	1/2/1988	Decision #	53403	Minister	Mike Ahern
Title	<i>Cape York International Spaceport</i>				
Date	28/11/1988	Decision #	55599	Minister	Mike Ahern
	<i>Cape York International Spaceport – Progress Report – November 1988</i>				

During 1986-1987, a proposal emerged to establish an international spaceport on Cape York, which would then support surrounding infrastructure including tourism infrastructure. The project enjoyed in principle support from the Commonwealth Labor Government – see the letter from Prime Minister Hawke attached to submission 53403.

The key attraction of the proposal was Cape York's proximity to the earth's Equator, which facilitates the successful launch of satellites. There were, at the time, no advanced western economies which could have provided launch sites closer to the equator.

A key aspect of the program was that the spaceport was to be privately built and operated with government support. Cabinet Decision 53403 shows the efforts to assist large businesses to establish consortia with the skills and economies of scale to undertake a project of this size.

In Decision 55599, however, the first signs of serious trouble for the spaceport emerged: there was already sufficient international launch capacity for the 20-30 satellites per year which were expected to be launched during the late 1980s and early 1990s. Uncertainty surrounding the economic viability of the spaceport was the key factor ending the project, although objections from traditional landowners, set against the incoming Goss Government's commitments to establish a Land Rights Act, and then the Mabo decision in 1992, also provided pressure against the Spaceport.

The land appropriated for the Spaceport was handed back to traditional owners in 2017.

Multi-Function Polis

Date	8/2/1988	Decision #	53505	Minister	Mike Ahern
Title	<i>Multi-Function-Polis</i>				
Date	7/6/1988	Decision #	54460	Minister	Mike Ahern
Title	<i>Multi-Function-Polis</i>				
Date	15/8/1988	Decision #	54898	Minister	Mike Ahern
Title	<i>Multi Function Polis (MFP) – Progress Report</i>				

The Multi-Function Polis was a proposal, by Japan's Ministry for International Trade and Industry (MITI), for a high technology city to be situated somewhere in Australia, as a driver of innovation and education. The city was to be fully-integrated, including work, education and leisure, and was a development of the "technopolis" concept already underway in Japan. The project had heavy backing from the Commonwealth, and several states canvassed potential sites for the MFP. Queensland's proposed site was on the Gold Coast.

The MFP concept ran into difficulties from the outset. MITI Japanese proposed a self-contained city in one location. This met strenuous opposition from the generation of Australians who had served in the Second World War and who remained antagonistic towards Japan as a result of Japanese war crimes against Australians. Given that a purpose of the Imperial Japanese Army in war was to build Japanese territory overseas, a perceived Japanese enclave was likely to attract concern.

More importantly, however, the MFP concept was ill-defined. While MITI sought a single, fixed entity and was focused on real estate and built infrastructure, Queensland's proposals focused more on the MFP as the hub of an innovation network stretching well beyond one location. Ultimately, due to the Goss Government's decision not to allocate land to the MFP on the terms desired by the MFP proponents, the MFP concept went to Adelaide, where it was largely unsuccessful, eventually being abandoned in 1998.

These three cabinet decisions indicate the early course of feasibility studies in Queensland. Even in these decisions, confusion about the MFP concept is apparent, as is concern about public perceptions of a developing Japanese enclave in Australia.

1996 Olympic Games Bid

TITLE: 1996 Olympic Games Bid – Preliminary Assessment

Date	10/06/1988	Decision #	54515	Minister	Mr M.J. Ahern
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Following an unsuccessful bid for the 1992 Olympics, Brisbane was enthusiastic to bid once more for the subsequent 1996 Olympic Games.

The 1996 Olympic Games were the centenary games, to occur 100 years on from the very first modern Olympic Games held in Athens in 1896. In recognition of the significant symbolism of an Athens bid, Cabinet resolved that a bid would only be made for Brisbane if there wasn't an apparent international preference for Athens.

Cabinet also had regard for the necessity of Commonwealth support. There had been a suggestion in the Senate by Senator Michael Macklin of Queensland, that Australia support Athens' bid due to its historical merit. Cabinet were forced to wait for the decision from the Commonwealth Government. As a result, Cabinet resolved that there be agreement *in principle* to support a Brisbane bid for the 1996 Games.

The first active step taken in pursuit of a Brisbane Games Bid was Cabinet decision 54871 to support the Brisbane Lord Mayor's petition of the citizens of Brisbane entreating the Australian Olympic Federation to select Brisbane as the Australian candidate City.

Australian Stockman's Hall of Fame

Date	8/2/1988	Decision #	53497	Minister	Brian Austin
Title	<i>Australian Stockman's Hall of Fame</i>				
Date	7/3/1988	Decision #	53712	Minister	Brian Austin
Title	<i>Australian Stockman's Hall of Fame</i>				
Date	11/4/1988	Decision #	54015	Minister	Brian Austin
Title	<i>Australian Stockman's Hall of Fame</i>				

The Australian Stockman's Hall of Fame and Outback Heritage Centre is located in Longreach. It was an approved bicentennial project, and most of its funding (\$9.1 Million of \$13.3 Million) came from Commonwealth, state and local governments.

The project managers had further difficulty obtaining private funding, and by early 1988 it was not clear that the centre would be ready for opening as planned in late April. Her Majesty the Queen had agreed to open the centre during her visit to Queensland to open Expo. It would therefore have been a matter of some embarrassment had the centre not been able to make up its shortfall.

Cabinet agreed in principle, in Cabinet Decision 53497, to make a further \$490,000 available to the centre (as a loan), provided the Commonwealth agreed to matching funding of \$1 Million. The state government had already committed \$510,000 more than the Commonwealth, so the net result would have been an even split in funding between the two governments.

A month later, Commonwealth funding had still not eventuated. Despite concerns regarding the management of the project, Cabinet was concerned about the imminent arrival of the Queen, and in Cabinet Decision 53712 agreed to loan up to a further \$500,000, without that loan being contingent on Commonwealth money.

Finally, by early April, the Commonwealth agreed to lend \$1 Million in a short-term, interest free loan. The Queensland Cabinet therefore adjusted the terms of its loan offer to the Hall of Fame, to ensure that repayments to the state government did not become a lesser priority compared to repayments to the Commonwealth.

The result was that the project was ready on time, and was opened by the Queen as scheduled.

Slings on working sites

TITLE: *Use of Synthetic Webbing or Natural Fibre Slings on Construction Sites*

Date	19/9/1988	Decision #	55156	Minister	Vince Lester
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Tragedy struck Queensland on 4 September 1988, during construction of the Commonwealth Bank Building on the corner of Queen St and Edward St in the Brisbane CBD.

Two concrete slabs were being hoisted by crane onto the site, when they broke through the slings holding them and plunged to the ground below, killing five-year old Nicholas Willemse, who had run on ahead of his parents. Two other people were killed, and seven people injured, including both of Nicholas' parents.

There was an immediate inquiry, and just four days after the tragedy, regulations were changed to implement the recommendations of that inquiry, requiring natural or synthetic fibre slings to be supplemented by wire or chain slings in any situation where their loads were to be hoisted over people, or where the loss of the load would harm people.

In this submission, Cabinet endorses that decision, giving it whole-of-government approval, and briefly surveying the other options which had been available.

ATSIC

Date	3/10/1988	Decision #	55247	Minister	Bob Katter Jr
Title	<i>Aborigines and Torres Strait Islanders Commission Bill</i>				
Date	17/10/1988	Decision #	55351	Minister	Bob Katter Jr
Title	<i>Aborigines and Torres Strait Islanders Commission Bill</i>				

In 1988, the Federal government proposed to establish the Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander Commission (ATSIC), a representative body of Indigenous people intended to increase self-determination in the administration of Indigenous Affairs.

The creation of ATSIC was met with substantial opposition from conservative perspectives in Australia, and these two submissions epitomise this. The key objections raised in Cabinet Decision 55247 were:

- that recognition of Indigenous people as the original owners of the land constituting Australia may give rise to land rights claims (bearing in mind the famous *Mabo* decision did not occur until 1992);
- that ATSIC could represent a parallel Indigenous parliament, thus undermining more traditional democratic structures;
- that the ATSIC bill could pave the way for a treaty, which may have unknown implications for governance in Queensland;
- that the elected nature of ATSIC may result in extremist activists being elected (Michael Mansell is particularly mentioned. Mansell inflamed racial debates in 1987-88 by cultivating a relationship with Libyan dictator Muammar Gaddafi); and
- that the relaxed approach to identifying Indigenous people may result in people claiming Indigenous heritage in order to obtain economic benefits (a criticism that Michael Mansell himself made later in 2001); or alternatively that the ATSIC model may result in funds going to Indigenous people on a basis other than need.

Cabinet speculated about a potential High Court challenge to the ATSIC bill, and Cabinet Decision 55351 summarises that advice. No High Court challenge occurred, and ATSIC existed from 1990 until 2004, when the Howard government disestablished ATSIC with opposition support, amidst widespread corruption allegations.

Disability Issues – Subsidised Taxis

TITLE: *Subsidised Taxi Travel for Severely Disabled Persons*

Date	30/05/1988	Decision #	54367	Minister	Mr I.J. Gibbs
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Beginning in 1987, the Queensland Government was providing subsidised taxi fares for severely disabled people. In 1988 it was apparent to Cabinet that the subsidy scheme had the budget and capability to assist more people across the State. The original scheme was limited to those who had access to a specially designed wheelchair accessible vehicle.

Such specialist vehicles had only been purchased by taxi companies in urban centres. It was only urban centres that had sufficient population density for a taxi company to find it worthwhile investing in a suitably equipped vehicle. However, this restricted the subsidised taxi travel scheme also to urban centres.

Cabinet decided that in smaller regional centres people should be able to access the subsidy even if a fully equipped vehicle had not been purchased. This would allow people who are able to utilise a regular taxi car to receive the subsidy. The Scheme was then available to a greater number and range of people distributed more broadly across Queensland.

Disability Issues – Intellectually Handicapped Citizens Act

TITLE: *Proposed Amendments to the Intellectually Handicapped Citizens Act 1985-1988*

Date	24/10/1988	Decision #	55393	Minister	Mr P.R. McKechnie
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The *Intellectually Disabled Citizens Act 1985* (Qld) was the first specific legislation in Queensland and continued to be constantly developed since its inception. One of the major contributions of the Act was to establish a Council with the power to engage employees who will be allocated to provide assistance to disabled Queenslanders. In 1988, Cabinet were continuing to identify the support that the Council required and where the Act was insufficient.

Cabinet decided that the Council must have greater powers of delegation in order to deal efficiently with all applications. And, in order to enable such delegation, that the Crown accept responsibility for any claims made against the Council and persons acting on its behalf. Liability was accepted by the Crown provided that the Council and its representatives had diligently and conscientiously endeavoured to carry out their duties.

The amendments approved by cabinet were later drafted as the *Intellectually Handicapped Citizens Act Amendment Bill 1988*. Approved by Cabinet as recorded by Cabinet Decision 55461. The Bill was passed into law by Government on 28 April 1989.

Domestic Violence Task Force

TITLE: *Report of the Queensland Domestic Violence Task Force*

Date	21/10/1988	Decision #	55392	Minister	Mr McKechnie
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On 10th August 1987, Cabinet approved (Decision No. 52206) the establishment of a Task Force to investigate, examine and report on domestic violence in Queensland. The report was received on 29th September 1988. The Task Force gathered and analysed a wealth of information concerning the violent and abusive behaviours between adult couples in domestic relationships. The Task Force examined physical, sexual and emotional abuse. Normal arguments and disagreements between couples were not the focus, rather the focus was upon serious violence and persistent abusive behaviour.

Over 500 human service agencies were contacted and 142 written submissions from victims, concerned citizens and organisations were received. Eight hundred and fifty-six individuals called a Domestic Violence Phone-In over four days, including 661 victims who completed a telephone questionnaire. The Task Force drew upon the views of a wide cross section of the Queensland community in preparing its report and recommendations.

Key findings of the Queensland Domestic Violence Task Force are summarised:

- There were no Australian studies of the incidence of this hidden problem.
- There was no single cause for domestic violence - individual, family, community and cultural factors interacted in varying strengths and combinations to produce violence to one's spouse.
- Overwhelmingly, women were the victims of domestic violence - men who were victims of domestic violence accounted for between 5% and 9% of all victims
- Injuries reported by victims were serious: 22% reported fractures, 27% reported head injuries and 25% reported lacerations.
- Over half (54%) reported permanent damage to their health as a result of spousal violence.
- Sexual abuse was reported by 29% of victims.
- Children were reported to have witnessed the violence in 90% of cases of victims who had dependent children – in 68% of these cases, respondents reported that their children were also being abused by their partner.
- one-third (35%) reported that a weapon had been used or threatened.
- Nearly half (47%) of victims said that alcohol had always or usually been consumed prior to the violence; 32% said alcohol was never involved.
- Only 56 victims (8.5%) reported that their partner had ever been arrested for assaulting them with the result that few perpetrators were being brought to justice.
- There was a lack of knowledge by human service providers in both the Government and non-government sectors of the nature of violence between spouses, the cyclic nature of the violence, and the available services.
- There was a lack of adequate treatment programs for perpetrators seeking to change their behaviour.
- The plight of victims in remote rural areas and those of non-English backgrounds had speaking received insufficient attention.
- The living conditions in many Aboriginal communities, together with the significant alcohol problems in those communities, had contributed to the levels of family violence.
- There was a lack of awareness of available services including the network of women's refuges throughout the State. When victims of domestic violence did leave their violent partner, they had difficulty in re-establishing a home for themselves and their

children - often in circumstances where they had few financial resources and were dislocated from former social support networks.

- The financial costs of domestic violence affected the whole community. The costing case study conducted for the Task Force found that the total cost of services provided to 20 victims of domestic violence was \$1,024,494, and included health services, police and legal costs, housing and crisis support services representing 62% of the total cost and finally that costs were largely born by the public purse.

Domestic Violence Task Force

TITLE: *Legislation Proposals of the Queensland Domestic Violence Task Force*

Date	03/11/1988	Decision #	55462	Minister	Mr McKechnie
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On 24th October 1988, Cabinet approved (Decision No. 55392) that the Report of the Queensland Domestic Violence Task Force be publicly released. A key recommendation of the Task Force was the introduction of separate legislation to provide for the protection of victims of domestic violence. The Task Force reviewed similar legislation in all other Australian States and Territories and provided detailed suggestions concerning the schema of proposed legislation for Queensland. Features of the legislation proposed included:

- a) Provisions so that a victim of domestic violence, a person on their behalf or a police officer could apply to a Magistrates Court for a Protection Order which would have the effect of restricting or imposing prohibitions on the behaviour of the spouse.
- b) The behaviours which a Protection Order would restrain included:
 - personal injury by one spouse against the other or where personal injury had previously occurred, a reasonable apprehension by the applicant that personal injury would again occur;
 - wilful damage to the property of one spouse by the other or where wilful damage had been committed, a reasonable apprehension by the applicant that such damage would again occur;
 - one spouse harassing, intimidating or behaving in an offensive or indecent manner toward the other;
 - threats to do any of the above things;
 - counselling or procuring another person to do any of the things mentioned above.
- c) In considering an application, the Court would apply the civil standard of proof, that is, the balance of probabilities.
- d) Protection Orders could prohibit or restrict a spouse from approaching an aggrieved party or prohibit or restrict access to the premises where the party lives.
- e) Protection Orders could have the effect of revoking a licence to possess a fire arm or other weapon
- f) Provisions were proposed so that a police officer in receipt of a complaint of domestic violence intending to make an application for a Protection Order, that the police officer could without warrant detain the spouse in custody for a period not in excess of four hours.
- g) Breach of a Protection Order would constitute a criminal offence and police officers could arrest without warrant a person whom they believed on reasonable grounds had committed or was committing a breach.

Domestic Violence Task Force

TITLE: *Legislation Proposals of the Queensland Domestic Violence Task Force*

Date	21/11/1988	Decision #	55564	Minister	Mr McKechnie
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On 7 November 1988 Cabinet approved (Decision No. 55462) the preparation of a Bill based on Recommendation 24 of the Report of the Queensland Domestic Violence Task Force subject to an increase in the penalties for a breach of a Protection Order. Cabinet further decided that the Bill be introduced into Parliament in the current Session. The Minister requested the responsible officers have discussions with representatives of the Queensland Law Society and the Bar Association of Queensland to ascertain their views on the proposals set forth in Recommendation 24 of the report of the Task Force.

During these discussions significant concerns were expressed concerning the proposed Police powers of entry to and search of premises, without warrant. These powers were regarded as unnecessary because the proposed powers only served to overcome a reluctance by Police to rely on their existing common law powers of entry and undesirable because they perceive a history of Police misusing powers of entry and search. Concern was also expressed regarding the proposed power to detain a person for up to four hours in custody, without charging them with an offence, in circumstances where a Police Officer had a reasonable apprehension that a spouse would be in imminent danger of suffering further injury. The Task Force proposed that where a person is so detained, the Police Officer must make an application to a Magistrate's Court for a protection order as soon as practicable. If an application could not be made before the expiration of the four-hour period, the person would be released on bail. The proposition was also put that in serious cases of domestic violence in which it is envisaged that such detention would be resorted to, an arrest could be made for a criminal charge such as committing or threatening assault. If this course was adopted the person would be held in custody and their release subject to the Bail Act.

The intent of the Bill was to provide a victim of domestic violence with protection from further violent or abusive behaviour by their spouse by a Magistrate's Court order placing restrictions and prohibitions on the spouse's behaviour. It was not intended that this could be lost sight of if public debate was to focus on Police powers which were machinery aspects of the Bill to enable protection to be afforded to victims.

Domestic Violence Task Force

TITLE: *Recommendations of the Queensland Domestic Violence Task Force*

Date	12/12/1988	Decision #	55759	Minister	Mr McKechnie
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On 24 October 1988 Cabinet approved (Decision No. 55392) that the report of the Queensland Domestic Violence Task Force be publicly released. Following the release, positive feedback was received supporting the implementation of the recommendations of the Task Force from a number of individuals and organisations including Catholic Social Welfare, the Division of Child and Family Welfare of the Uniting Church and Lifeline State Council.

All 65 recommendations received in principle support. As a package, the recommendations provided a basis on which appropriate action could be taken to address the serious problem of domestic violence in the community.

Recommendations 5, 30 and 48 were supported subject to available funds. Funds were requested to be allocated to the Department of Family Services for a financial assistance program to enable non-government organisations to provide specialised treatment services for the perpetrators of domestic violence; training programs for human service workers and regionally based key workers to facilitate the establishment, development and maintenance of treatment services for perpetrators of domestic violence; to establish a Domestic Violence Service with financial assistance from the Queensland Government to provide personal counselling and information by telephone to victims and perpetrators of domestic violence and offer a refuge referral service; and finally; that the Department of Family Services earmark funds under the Family Welfare Community Development Worker Program for the employment of community welfare workers.

Legislation before Parliament at the time addressed recommendations 18 and 41 that the Minister for Justice and Attorney-General be requested to further consider the proposed amendment to section 347 of the Queensland Criminal Code dealing with rape to give greater protection to spouses from sexual attack by a partner and to guarantee protection for spouses who have taken steps to repudiate their marital relations. Further, that the Queensland Housing Commission institute a system whereby persons who have been granted a bond guarantee by the Queensland Housing Commission have the opportunity of questioning, and negotiating, claims made by landlords/agents that a proportion of the bond be forfeited and that, where alleged damage is disputed, staff of the Queensland Housing Commission inspect premises before any such claims are paid.

Action had already been implemented with respect to recommendations 1, 57 and 58, being that the *Beyond These Walls: The Report of the Queensland Domestic Violence Task Force*, be released as a public document by the Minister for Family Services and Welfare Housing; that the Department of Family Services initiate a Domestic Violence Awareness Program with sufficient resources to assist the implementation of a broad range of community awareness and education strategies by diverse groups in the community that have as their goal reducing the prevalence of domestic violence in Queensland and that the Department of Family Services appoint a fulltime coordinator to implement and have oversight the Domestic Violence Awareness Program.

Artificial Insemination and IVF

TITLE: *Artificial Insemination and In Vitro Fertilisation: Demack Report*

Date	18/03/1988	Decision #	53835	Minister	Mr McKechnie Mr Clauson
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On 11 May 1987 Cabinet (Decision No. 51387) approved the preparation of legislation concerning artificial conception and the consequences flowing from the use of such procedures. In its decision, Cabinet approved amendments to the *Status of Children Act* and the *Registration of Births, Deaths and Marriages Act*. Cabinet also approved the preparation of a Bill making surrogacy negotiations, arrangements and advertising illegal. The name of the portfolio responsible was changed to *Family Services and Welfare Housing*. The Bill to amend the *Status of Children Act* sets out the changes which were necessary to place children born from an artificial conception procedure in the same legal position as children born from natural conception.

The principal amendment in the Bill is to insert five new sections into the Act. These deal with the parties to the marriage or relationship and their relationship to the child born through an artificial conception procedure. The amendments contained in Sections 15-17 were applied by a new Section 14 to pregnancies occurring before or after the passing of the Bill. It also applies to pregnancies resulting from procedures carried out in or outside Queensland, and to children born before or after the passage of the Bill. The retrospective application was deemed necessary to confer legal status upon a child born from artificial conception procedures. Section 3 of the existing Status of Children Act also provides for the inclusion of children born before the commencement of the Act, to be treated as legitimate children of a marriage.

The Bill provides that the husband shall be presumed to have caused the pregnancy and to be the father of the child born from that pregnancy. The producer of the semen is presumed not to be the child's father. It was originally considered that it would be necessary to amend the Registration of Births, Deaths and Marriages Act in conjunction with the Status of Children Act. The drafting of the sections dealing with the parties to the marriage, artificial conception, and the resulting child, makes a presumption that for all purposes the child is a child of the marriage. This has the effect that when a birth is registered the social father is, by legal presumption, standing in the place of the biological father and no amendment is necessary. The Surrogate Parenthood Bill 1987, which was also attached to this Submission was to be updated to be known as the Surrogate Parenthood Bill 1988. To avoid protracted publicity, it was agreed that the two Bills were to be introduced conjointly.

National Child Support Scheme

Date	23/05/1988	Decision #	54319	Minister	Mr Clauson Mr McKechnie
Title	<i>Proposals on National Child Support</i>				

Cabinet agreed that Queensland would participate in the Child Support Scheme which has been implemented by the Commonwealth Government and that this decision be publicly announced. This Decision gave further time for the consideration of the contents of the Submission to be deferred until the Meeting of Cabinet held late in May 1988. By Decision No. 50744 of 16th February 1987 Cabinet approved the formation of a working party comprising State and Commonwealth officials to report to Cabinet in due course on proposals with respect to the establishment of the Child Support Scheme of the Commonwealth Government. The Commonwealth Child Support Scheme commenced on 1 June 1988 in accordance with the provisions of the Child Support Act 1988 (Commonwealth). One purpose of the Scheme was to maximise the enforcement of maintenance orders made by the courts with respect to children of a marriage (nuptial children) and in those jurisdictions where a reference of powers in respect of ex-nuptial children has been made of those children. It was considered that the system devised by the Commonwealth would provide an effective and efficient mechanism whereby child maintenance payments would be enforced.

The system was to operate by utilizing the services of the Commonwealth Taxation Department and placed an obligation on employers to withhold from an employee's pay that sum of money which had been ordered by a court of competent jurisdiction as a maintenance payment. There was little public objection to the Scheme at the time as the overwhelming weight of public opinion was that such persons should meet their obligations. Of note from the report, there were substantial differences between the Queensland law relating to the levels of maintenance and the Commonwealth provisions now contained in the Family Law Act. Larger amounts of maintenance would be ordered under the Family Law Act in the future and there were then a number of orders under the State Maintenance Act in existence which would need to be reviewed upon enforcement.

National Child Support Scheme

TITLE: *Proposals on National Child Support*

Date	30/05/1988	Decision #	54362	Minister	Mr Clauson Mr McKechnie
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This decision provided that agreement in principle be given that Queensland would participate in the Child Support Scheme which was already being implemented by the Commonwealth Government. It was decided that this Decision be publicly announced and that a statement be made that the Scheme would be applied after appropriate legislation was enacted early in the following Budget session of Parliament. Also, that subject to appropriate negotiations taking place with the Commonwealth Attorney-General, the implementation of the Scheme was to be by way of the adoption of the Children Support Act of the Commonwealth. It was agreed that the Honourable the Minister for Justice and Attorney-General be authorised to liaise with the Commonwealth Attorney-General to give effect to this Decision and to ensure that Queensland was provided with adequate details of the monitoring and assessment of the initiative. It was further agreed that the Inter-Departmental Committee be directed to examine the provisions of the Maintenance Act and recommend changes there after the development of the formula for assessment of maintenance and the recently made amendments to the Family Law Act (Commonwealth).

Creation of Wife's Action for Loss of Consortium

TITLE: *Wife's Action for Loss of Consortium*

Date	10/10/1988	Decision #	55261	Minister	Mr Clauson
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This decision sought approval to be given for the preparation of a Bill to be titled the Law Reform (Wife's Loss of Consortium) Act to enable a wife to bring an action for loss of her husband's consortium. Recent publicity at the time of this proposal focused on the plight of Mrs Heather Thorne, whose husband was left permanently disabled as a result of a motor vehicle accident on 11th January 1985. Mr Thorne sustained a degree of brain damage and as a consequence showed no love or feeling for his wife. Mr Thorne had instituted a third-party damage claim, but Mrs Thorne was unable to bring her own action for loss of her husband's consortium.

At common law, only a husband had the right to sue for loss of his wife's consortium. In an action for loss of consortium, a husband could be compensated for loss of these non-material components, together with expenses incurred in replacing the wife's services, the cost of medical expenses incurred by him and the cost of hospital visits. The action for loss of consortium is medieval in origin and was originally based on the notion that a husband had a proprietary interest in his wife, so that an injury to her constituted not only a wrong to her but also entitled him to a separate cause of action for loss of her consortium.

Legislatures in the Commonwealth countries had responded to this anomaly by either abolishing the action or introducing legislation to enable wives to bring an action for loss of consortium. The action had been abolished in England, New Zealand, New South Wales and Tasmania. South Australia had taken the opposite approach and had legislated to enable a wife to bring the action. From a policy point of view, it was considered undesirable to abolish the husband's right to bring an action for loss of consortium, as it was such an entrenched part of our legal system. On the other hand, it was considered as a positive and innovative step, one that was long overdue if this legislation was enacted to accord women equal status with men in this area.

Class Sizes in State Schools

Date	10/05/1988	Decision #	54199	Minister	Mr B.G. Littleproud
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Increases in class sizes were attributed to a rise in student numbers between February 1987 and February 1988, combined with a decrease in the teacher establishment in both Primary and Secondary Divisions during this period. The decline in establishment was in response to the reduced funding provided to Education in the 1987-88 Budget. Year 1-7 classroom teacher numbers decreased by 211 between February 1987 and February 1988, despite an increase of nearly 3200 students. For Years 8-12, the number of English classes increased by 60 in the same period, but student numbers increased by over 2400.

As a consequence of the increasing class sizes the practice of forming composite classes became more prevalent. The implementation of Parliamentary Select Committee recommendations with respect to the reduction in class size was timetabled over a four-year period, commencing in 1983. The goal was to achieve specific class size targets for single teacher primary and secondary classes in State schools.

For primary classes the maximum sizes were targeted as:

- 25 in single-year-level classes for Years 1-3;
- 30 in single-year-level classes for Years 4-7; and
- 25 in multi-year (composite) classes.

For secondary classes the maximum sizes were targeted as:

- 30 in single-year level classes for Years 8-10; and
- 25 in single-year level classes for Years 11 and 12.

No recommendations were made regarding the maximum size of multiple-teacher classes, special classes, composite classes containing secondary students or preschool classes.

Drug Education in Schools

TITLE: *Drug Education in Queensland: The Roles of School-Based Programmes and Other Resource Agencies*

Date	15/02/1988	Decision #	53532	Minister	Mr B.G. Littleproud
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In July 1986, by Cabinet (Decision Number 49339), a *Queensland School Drug Education Program Evaluation Committee* was established. The research study was endorsed by Cabinet on 1 February 1988, (Decision number 53396) and was designed to provide a rigorous evaluation of the impact of school-based drug education Programs being conducted in Queensland. This study informed the work of the Evaluation Committee and guided subsequent recommendations to Cabinet. Through concentrated and co-operative effort between the Departments of Health and Education and with other community groups, the quality of drug education programs in Queensland schools was raised dramatically. Drug Arm, the Alcohol and Drug Foundation of Queensland, and the Life Education Centre were the major contributors.

The major thrust of drug education for school - aged students in Queensland was directed into school-based initiatives. The programs were designed to integrate with the broader curriculum areas in the school context. The strategies used in were predominantly:

- a) focussed on social influences that promote drug use;
- b) making students aware of pressures to smoke, drink and use other drugs;
- c) teaching techniques for dealing with those pressures;
- d) building group pressures against drug use to undermine the common belief that it is desirable or harmless to experiment with drugs.

Specific funding provided by the State Government was modest. Nevertheless, the school-based drug education initiatives were highly regarded by drug educators and researchers in reducing and delaying drug use.

Royal Anthem in State Schools

TITLE: *Playing the Royal Anthem in State School Ceremonies*

Date	21/03/1988	Decision #	53838	Minister	Mr B.G. Littleproud
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Cabinet, by Decision No 50932 of 16 March 1987, reviewed the general policy in respect of the playing of the Royal Anthem and the National Anthem, but did not specify that the guidelines should apply to State Schools. It was deemed not specific enough for School ceremonies are invariably fairly simple Current policy gives emphasis to the Royal Anthem.

Possible changes considered were:

- (a) to reverse the process and give emphasis to the National Anthem; or
- (b) to amend the current policy to give equal emphasis to each Anthem.

It was considered that with the Bicentennial and Expo atmosphere of the time, and with Royal Visits to Queensland imminent, a change to current policy at the time could create controversy and force the Government into a defensive position. The possibility of embarrassment to Royal visitors was to be avoided.

It was counter proposed that the policy be reviewed after the conclusion of Expo 1988 and that such policy, if amended, be disseminated to schools on a low-key basis through Regional Offices, inspectors' conferences, principals' conferences and the like.

Fire Service Levy

Date	1/2/1988	Decision #	53412	Minister	Russell Cooper
Title	<i>Redemption of Debt of Queensland Fire Services from Consolidated Revenue</i>				
Date	14/3/1988	Decision #	53778	Minister	Russell Cooper
Title	<i>Fire Services Levy</i>				
Date	18/4/1988	Decision #	54038	Minister	Russell Cooper
Title	<i>Fire Services Levy</i>				
Date	16/5/1988	Decision #	54275	Minister	Russell Cooper
Title	<i>Recovery of Arrears of Fire Services Levies</i>				

Prior to 1984, fire services in Queensland were paid for by a levy on insurance policies which included protection for fire damage (on the rationale that insurers benefit substantially from fire services). Unfortunately this had the perverse effect of rewarding those who did not insure at all, those who under-insured their properties, and those who insured overseas.

The Fire Service Levy (now the Emergency Management Levy) was introduced in 1984 as a lump sum payment to be paid according to property type, and collected by Councils along with rates. The levy was unpopular and was poorly implemented. Issues such as how to divide the levy responsibilities of owners and renters of a property, do not appear to have been sufficiently thought through.

The result was that many people simply refused to pay, and the receipts from commercial property owners in particular fell well short of what they had been under the previous insurance-based system. This, in turn, led the fire service to rely on loans from the Queensland Treasury. As those loans began to mount, Cabinet grew concerned, requesting (in [Cabinet Decision 53412](#)) Minister Cooper to report back on a mechanism to improve the scheme. He reported back in [Cabinet Decisions 53778 and 54038](#), and recommended increases in the levy on commercial property in order to make up the shortfall.

In terms of the arrears, many local councils indicated (unsurprisingly) that they did not wish to collect arrears on the state government's behalf, so in [Cabinet Decision 54275](#) Cabinet decided to appoint private collection agencies to collect arrears.

Loans Council

TITLE: *Premiers' Conference/Loan Council Meeting*

Date	16/5/1988	Decision #	54289	Minister	Mike Ahern
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The Loan Council is an intergovernmental council, generally attended by the Treasurers or Finance Ministers of each jurisdiction, along with the Premiers' Conference each year. The primary function of the Loan Council is to co-ordinate Federal, State and Territory borrowing, so that overall national government debt can be managed, and also so that Australian jurisdictions do not end up competing with one another for debt conditions. The Loan Council typically sets ceilings for borrowings by each jurisdiction in each year.

In 1988, the Commonwealth government was led by Prime Minister Bob Hawke and treasurer Paul Keating. They were endeavouring to manage a national economy still reeling from the 1987 stock market crash, and were aware of the heavy debt loads carried by both government and private industry (which ultimately led to the "recession we had to have"). This did not, however, stop the Federal Government from spending heavily ahead of the 1990 election to shore up its electoral prospects.

In 1988, the Federal Government proposed an overall reduction of 4.5% in general purpose grants to the states, and substantial cuts to Queensland's share of the overall borrowing limit. Queensland's loan limit was to be cut by 31.7% while the limit of the other states and territories was reduced by 5.1 to 5.8%. The Commonwealth position was that this was a correction to bring Queensland back into line with the other states, as Queensland's loan limits had been raised in the early 1980s to allow for major project spending on projects such as the Commonwealth Games and Expo.

Premier Ahern refused to agree to the reduction in loan limits, which led to conflict between himself and Treasurer Keating, with the latter threatening to reduce Queensland's grant allocation to offset any additional borrowing by Queensland. Premier Ahern's take on the events is succinctly set out in para 11 of the submission:

Having attended my first Premiers' Conference, I found the decision-making process grossly unsatisfactory, and a very poor way of managing the economic affairs of our country.

1988/89 Budget

Date	30/5/1988	Decision #	54403	Minister	Brian Austin
Title	<i>1988/1989 State Budget</i>				
Date	22/8/1988	Decision #	54968	Minister	Ahern & Austin
Title	<i>1988/1989 State Budget</i>				

These two decisions bookend the state budget process.

The first decision, Cabinet Decision 54403, closely follows the Premiers Conference and Loan Council meeting (see Cabinet Decision 54289). The figures in that decision presume modest overall increases in Commonwealth and loan funding, resulting in difficulty meeting the state's budget requirements from current sources. Departments are advised that the process of global allocation will be continued, whereby departments are allocated an overall portion of the budget, for each department to allocate to its own units and programs.

It is indicated in this decision that the government's "Expenditure Review Committee" (ERC - commonly referred to as a "Razor Gang") would be looking for ways to reduce government expenditure in a number of areas, either by reducing expenditure outright, or by privatising government services.

Cabinet Decision 54968 completes the budget process, resulting in a balanced budget, primarily balanced by expenditure reductions from the ERC, tax on tobacco products, and increases to liquor licence fees.